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THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CLARIFIES ITS POSITION CONCERNING PEER
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: BUT WILL FEDERAL
COURTS TAKE NOTICE?
Mark Blais'
Congress enacted Title IX as part of the education amendments of
1972 to protect individuals from sex discrimination in any educational
program or activity receiving federal aid.' The lack of any federal statute
addressing sex discrimination in educational institutions motivated Con-
gress to enact Title IX.2 Initially, Title IX was used primarily to chal-
lenge discrimination in school admission policies,3 hiring and promotion
+ J.D. candidate, May 199, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1994) (stating that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance").
2. See H.R. REP. No. 92-554 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512
(stating that Title VII "specifically excludes educational institutions from its terms," and
thus, Title IX is needed to "bring those in education under the equal employment provi-
sion"); Pamela W. Kernie, Comment, Protecting Individuals From Sex Discrimination:
Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 155, 156 (1992) (using Title IX's legislative history to explain its purpose of provid-
ing relief to those aggrieved by discriminatory practices in educational institutions);
Kirsten M. Eriksson, Note, What Our Children Are Really Learning in School: Using Title
IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1803 (1995) (noting that Title
IX fills a gap between Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
3. See Davis v. Monroe County Rd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1996)
(Davis I) (acknowledging that Title IX's chief purpose was initially to challenge discrimi-
natory practices in admission policies and athletic programs), vacated en banc, 120 F.3d
1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,1416
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (explaining that Title IX was originally limited to claims challenging dis-
crimination in athletic and admission policies); 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh) (stating that "the crux of Title IX is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds... [which] would cover such crucial aspects
as admissions procedures, [and] scholarships"); see also Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch.
Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 780 (3d Cir. 1990) (addressing a Title IX case against a high school for
revoking a female student's admission to the National Honor Society after she became
pregnant from pre-marital sexual activity); Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
501 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1974) (analyzing a suit brought against an educational in-
stitution for its discriminatory practice of requiring higher admissions standards for girls to
balance its male-to-female ratio).
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policies,4 and the allocation of federal funds in school athletic programs.
Title IX, however, has become a major tool in the fight against sexual
harassment in educational institutions.6
According to the United States Department of Education, Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), sexual harassment is "verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of
the recipient, that denies, limits, provides different, or conditions the
provision of aid, benefits, services or treatment protected under title
IX."7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
agency responsible for implementing regulations regarding sexual har-
4. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 519-520 (1982) (discussing
whether employment discrimination is covered by Title IX's prohibitions); Chance v. Rice
Univ., 989 F.2d 179, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing whether a "disparate impact" theory
of discrimination applies in a Title IX case involving university assignment and compensa-
tion practices); 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (emphasizing that Title IX "would cover such
crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment").
5. See Julie Elizabeth Davis, Should Schools Be Held Liable for Peer Sexual Har-
assment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972?, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
219, 219 (1996) (noting that Title IX was used primarily as a means to assist women seek-
ing equal access to athletic teams); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893-900
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding that Title IX covers discrimination in school athletic programs),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997);
Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that Title IX prohibits
sex discrimination in school athletic programs). Title IX's greatest contribution thus far
has been in the area of women's collegiate athletics, where it has precipitated marked in-
creases in opportunities available to female athletes. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893-900 (dis-
cussing whether Title IX covers discrimination in school athletic programs); Haffer, 688
F.2d at 15-17 (addressing a case brought by students who alleged that a university commit-
ted sex discrimination in its athletic programs); see also Barbara Huebner, Title IX has
been crew's propeller, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Oct. 19, 1997, at D12 (discussing Title
IX's effect on women's crew). For example, in theory colleges with a 45% female student
body should also have 45% female athletes as well. See id. Traditionally, the large num-
ber of males on college football teams has distorted the percentages in favor of men. See
id. However, Title IX has helped to lessen the disparity by providing women with oppor-
tunities in a wider variety of sports, such as in women's crew. See id.
6. For examples of pivotal cases in Title IX jurisprudence as applied to sexual har-
assment in educational institutions, see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 76 (1992) (making compensatory damages available for Title IX violations), and Lip-
sett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (using Title VII stan-
dards in the context of sex-related employment discrimination under Title IX). Although
schools traditionally responded to claims of peer sexual harassment by questioning the
victim's complicity in the aggressor's behavior and labeling such claims as normal male
behavior, peer sexual harassment has proven recently to be a genuine concern. See Davis,
supra note 5, at 219.
7. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting an OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Liti-
gation, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31,
1981)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997) (describ-
ing factors that lead to a finding of sexual harassment).
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assment in the work environment, established two forms of workplace
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
are applicable to the Title IX analysis of sexual harassment in educa-
tional institutions. These two forms of workplace sexual harassment in-
clude quid pro quo harassment9 and hostile environment harassment.10
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employee is coerced
into sexual conduct as a condition of maintaining employment." Hostile
environment sexual harassment involves sexually harassing conduct that
is so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of the working or
learning environment. Within the academic arena, hostile environment
sexual harassment may occur in two ways-by a school employee's har-
assment of a student 3 or by one student's harassment of another stu-
dent. 4 Regardless of which scenario occurs, courts generally apply stan-
dards established under Title VII's treatment of workplace sexual
harassment to guide their interpretation in Title IX disputes because Ti-
tle IX failed to specify a standard. 5 For example, some courts adhered to
8. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (explaining that sexual harassment may be present
when employment decisions are based on performance of sexual favors, or when an em-
ployer's conduct is not linked such economic decisions as employment, but nevertheless
causes a hostile working environment); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1986) (discussing how the EEOC defined two forms of sexual harassment, quid pro
quo and hostile environment).
9. See infra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment).
10. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining hostile environment sexual
harassment).
11. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (explaining that when quid pro quo sexual harassment
occurs a connection exists between an employer's behavior and a grant or denial of an
economic benefit to an employee); 29 C.F.R § 1604.11 (discussing quid pro quo sexual
harassment in the context of Title VII); infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing
quid pro quo sexual harassment).
12. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (discussing hostile environment sexual harassment in
the workplace, as defined by the EEOC); 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (recognizing hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment as constituting a legal form of sexual harassment).
13. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 899-901 (1st Cir. 1988)
(addressing the liability of an educational institution for the alleged discriminatory treat-
ment of a female surgical resident by a superior under Title IX).
14. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 66-70 (D.N.H. 1997) (ad-
dressing a claim brought by a junior high student against a school board for failing to rem-
edy alleged sexual harassment committed by fellow students).
15. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (stating that
the same rule that applies "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate" under Title
VII "should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student) (quoting Meri-
tor, 477 U.S. at 64 (a Title VII case)); Davis 1, 74 F.3d at 1190, 1193 (employing Title VII
standards in a Title IX hostile environment claim against a school for its knowing failure
to remedy the sexual harassment); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57
F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that in "claims of discrimination brought under Title
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Title VII's requirement that an entity have actual or constructive notice
of sexual harassment before finding liability in the context of employee-
on-student sexual harassment. 6  Courts have disagreed vehemently,
IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally
adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII"); Lipseu,
864 F.2d at 896-97 (holding that Title VII standards for proving discriminatory treatment
apply to employment-related claims arising under Title IX); Mabry v. State Bd. of Com-
munity Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (regarding
Title VII as "the most appropriate analogue when analyzing cases under Title IX").
16. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 900-01 (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor
to conclude that an educational institution could be liable for its failure to remedy hostile
environment sexual harassment directed toward a trainee by a supervisor, even if the vic-
tim of such harassment fails to notify the proper officials); Saville v. Houston County
Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (holding that the "knew or
should have known" standard of liability is appropriate where hostile environment sexual
harassment is perpetrated by a school employee against a student). These holdings, how-
ever, were recently overruled by a controversial Supreme Court decision. See Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (1998) (concluding that damages are
unavailable under Title IX in circumstances involving the sexual harassment of a student
by a teacher, "unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliber-
ately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct"); see also Richard Carelli, Sexual harass-
ment rulings differ for workplace, school, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, June 28, 1998, at A21
(stating that the Supreme Court's decision "to shield school districts from responsibility
when teachers harass students unless administrators knew and [deliberately] did nothing
about it," creates "a daunting trek for families of students victimized by teacher miscon-
duct").
In Gebser, a high school teacher engaged in a sexual relationship with a ninth-grade stu-
dent. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993. The relationship consisted of sexual intercourse on
numerous occasions, extending through the summer and into the student's tenth-grade
year. See id. Although the student failed to report the relationship, parents of other stu-
dents complained to the principal about inappropriate sexual remarks made by the teacher
in class. See id. The principal subsequently warned the teacher about his classroom com-
ments, but neglected to implement an official grievance procedure for receiving com-
plaints of sexual harassment or distribute an official policy on sexual harassment. See id.
Soon thereafter, a town police officer found the teacher and student having sex and ar-
rested the teacher. See id.
In its analysis, the Court noted first that Title IX, unlike Title VII, does not expressly
mandate the application of agency principles. See id. at 1995-96 (finding no "reference to
an educational institution's 'agents"' in Title IX's language). Next, the Court reasoned
that "[b]ecause the private right of action under Title IX is judicially implied, we have a
measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the stat-
ute ... [so as] to avoid frustrating [its] purposes." Id. at 1996. The Court ultimately con-
cluded "that it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery
against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on principles
of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a school district
official." Id. at 1997. Indeed, the Court noted that Congress never mentioned "the sub-
ject of either the right or the remedy" under Title IX, and that when it "expressly consid-
ered both in Title VII [Congress] restricted the amount of damages available." Id. Thus,
the Court determined that a damage recovery against a funding recipient, absent actual
knowledge of the discrimination, should be limited. See id.
After examining Title IX's purpose, the constitutional authority pursuant to which Con-
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however, on the proper method of extending liability to school districts
for student-on-student, or "peer," sexual harassment. 7
gress enacted Title IX, and the means and procedures governing Title IX's enforcement,
the Court then found that the implied damages remedy under Title IX should be "predi-
cated upon notice to an 'appropriate person' and an opportunity to rectify any violation."
Id. at 1999. The Court defined an "appropriate person" to be, "at a minimum, an official
of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination."
Id. As a result, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that "a damages remedy will not
lie under Title IX unless ... [an appropriate person] has actual knowledge of discrimina-
tion in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond," and such response "must
amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination." Id.
Although Gebser did not address school district liability in the case of peer sexual har-
assment, the Court nowhere expressly limited its holding to Title IX sexual harassment
suits brought by students against teachers. Thus, it seems that, despite the OCR's policy
and a strong dissent from the majority's holding, the method of extending liability to
school districts for peer sexual harassment advocated in this Comment and many others
will continue unrealized. Due to the lack of a Supreme Court decision expressly address-
ing peer sexual harassment under Title IX, however, the presence of a clearly divided
Court, and Congress' ability to overturn this holding with future legislation, the informa-
tion in this Comment remains relevant. Indeed, the Court in Gebser conditioned its deci-
sion on the possibility that Congress will wield its power to clarify its intent and address
this issue directly. See id. at 2000 (stating that "[u]ntil Congress speaks directly on the
subject . . . we will not hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX for a
teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and deliberate indiffer-
ence"). In addition, a four-justice dissent chastised the majority's conclusion that "be-
cause the private cause of action under Title IX is 'judicially implied,' the Court has 'a
measure of latitude' to use its own judgment in shaping a remedial scheme" as contrary to
"our precedents [and] to our duty to interpret, rather than to revise, congressional com-
mands." Id. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent, moreover, found that the ma-
jority's policy explanation with respect to the appropriate remedy "thwarts the purposes of
Title IX." Id. In fact, the dissent concluded that "the use of passive verbs in Title IX, fo-
cusing on the victim of the discrimination rather than the particular wrongdoer, gives this
statute broader coverage than Title VII," which requires much less stringent proof to hold
employers liable for workplace sexual harassment. Id. at 2002. Finally, the dissent criti-
cized the majority for failing to recognize that its holding will essentially eliminate the
availability of a cause of action to recover damages under Title IX and for "rank[ing] pro-
tection of the school district's purse above the protection of immature high school stu-
dents." Id. at 2007.
17. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (requiring
that a school district have actual notice of peer harassment and intentionally discriminate
against the victim for it to be liable, even though the OCR's recently issued Sexual Har-
assment Guidance advocated a different test); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (Davis II) (rejecting the applicability of stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment in Title IX claims). But see Doe v. Oyster River Co-
op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 475-76 (D.N.H. 1997) (adopting exact Title VII and OCR
criteria in a peer sexual harassment case only two months after the Londonderry decision
in the same federal district).
The level of knowledge required of a school district in Title IX peer sexual harassment
cases has been the focus of substantial dispute among the courts. Compare Doe v. Peta-
luma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (extending liability under
Title IX if the school district "knows or should have known of the hostile environment and
fails to take corrective action"), with Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F.
1998] 1367
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While federal courts continue to quarrel over the issue of school dis-
trict liability for peer sexual harassment, claims of pervasive sexual be-
havior between students have been growing in exorbitant numbers." In-
creases in sexual harassment claims, 9 studies illustrating the deleterious
effects of sexual harassment' on students,' ° and the differing approaches
of federal courts in developing applicable criteria to determine the liabil-
ity of school districts prompted the OCR to issue a policy guidance, ex-
plicitly clarifying its policy on extending liability to school districts in
peer sexual harassment cases under Title IX." The OCR adopted a test
Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (extending liability under Title IX if the school district
had actual knowledge of the harassment and "intentionally" failed to correct the situa-
tion), and Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.) (finding that
a school district cannot be liable under Title IX if the district itself does not treat claims of
sexual harassment differently based on the sex of the complainant), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing a stu-
dent's Title IX claim against a school district for its alleged failure to remedy sexual har-
assment perpetrated by other students); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d
1006, 1008-10 (5th Cir.) (same), 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist.,
956 F. Supp. 1209, 1210-11 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.
Supp. 1415, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Wright., 940 F. Supp. at 1414 (same); Bruneau v.
South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,166 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Burrow v.
Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Bosley
v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006,1013 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (same).
19. See supra note 18 (listing cases involving peer sexual harassment claims). In-
creases in peer sexual harassment claims have catapulted this issue into the mind of the
public. See Tamara Henry, More kids sue school over peer sex harassment, USA TODAY,
Oct. 1, 1996, at ID (illustrating one of many recent cases against a school district for al-
leged sexual misconduct instigated by students in the educational environment). In addi-
tion, much public attention followed the suspension of a six-year-old boy from school after
he kissed a female classmate on the cheek. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment
of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034,
12,034 (1997) (confirming that an incident involving a kiss on the cheek between two first
graders does give rise to a valid sexual harassment claim); Katy Kelly & David J. Lynch,
Headlines, Smooch lands 1st-grader in hot water, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 1996, at 1A (ex-
plaining the public uproar that resulted from the suspension of a six-year-old boy from
school for kissing a fellow student on the cheek).
20. See AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS:
THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 15 (1993)
[hereinafter AAUW SURVEY]. A 1993 study by the American Association of University
Women Educational Foundation (AAUW) found that of the 85% of girls in grades eight
through eleven who had been victims of unwelcome sexual affronts or touching in school,
33% did not want to attend school, 32% did not want to talk in class as often, and 24%
skipped class or school in an attempt to avoid further harassment. See id. at 7, 15. Female
students also reported feelings of fear, confusion, and a loss of self-esteem due to sexual
harassment. See id. at 17; see also NAN D. STEIN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC (AND PRIVATE) SCHOOLS 2-7 (The Wellesley College Center
for Research on Women, 1993) (finding that the majority of girls who experienced sexual
harassment were harassed by their peers).
21. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,034 (confirming that sexual
The Department of Education Clarifies its Position
for peer sexual harassment that is directly analogous to Title VII princi-
ples of extending liability to employers for sexual harassment in the
workplace.' Under this approach, a school district can only be held li-
able for peer sexual harassment if it fails to take immediate and proper
remedial action in response to the harassment of one student by another
student that creates a hostile learning environment that the district
"kn[ew] or should have known" existed.2 The OCR's policy guidance
clearly established that a school district that fails to respond effectively to
the existence of a hostile environment may be found liable upon actual
or constructive notice.24
Despite the OCR's unequivocal assertion that, similar to Title VII
cases, liability may be extended if the school district knew or should have
known of the sexual harassment and failed to correct it, federal courts
continue to shape their own tests.2 For instance, the United States Dis-
trict Court of the District of New Hampshire recently rendered a deci-
sion on the issue of extending liability to school districts for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX, and decided to modify the OCR's adoption
of strict Title VII principles, calling its decision a "moderate approach. ' 26
harassment of students by school employees, other students, or third parties is actionable
under Title IX). The OCR's policy guidance was a response to numerous "requests from
school officials, teachers, parents, students and others for information on [peer sexual har-
assment.]" See Education Department Issues Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5711388. In addition to the OCR's stan-
dards for establishing the liability of a school district for its failure to remedy peer sexual
harassment, the policy guidance contains suggestions on how schools can recognize, re-
spond, and prevent sexual harassment. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at
12,034.
22. Compare Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 (stating that
school district liability for peer sexual harassment may exist if "the school knows or should
have known of the harassment, and ... [it] fails to take immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action"), with EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (con-
cluding that Title VII allows claims based on hostile environment sex discrimination if an
employer knew or should have known of the existence of a hostile environment and failed
to respond properly).
23. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 (finding that a construc-
tive notice standard is sufficient in peer sexual harassment cases); see also infra notes 151,
153 (describing the "unwelcome" and "pervasive" elements of a sexually hostile environ-
ment claim that are necessary to determine if certain harassing acts are actionable).
24. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,042. A school district has
notice of a sexually hostile environment "if it actually 'knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care, should have known' about the harassment." Id. (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991)). The "should have known" portion of this inquiry estab-
lishes the existence of constructive notice as opposed to actual notice. See id.
25. See supra note 17 (noting the differences in approaches adopted by federal courts
for extending liability to school districts for peer sexual harassment).
26. See Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 74 (explaining the "moderate approach[]" as
allowing a plaintiff to bring suit against a school district under Title IX upon proof of the
1998] 1369
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In Doe v. Londonderry School District,27 Jane Doe, a seventh grade stu-
dent at the Londonderry Junior High School (LJHS), alleged that three
boys began to harass her in September 1993.2 According to Jane, the
three boys frequently called her vulgar, sexually derogatory names in the
presence of others who were encouraged by the boys to join in the name-
calling.29 The episodes of abusive behavior continued to escalate, and
Jane informed the school's guidance counselor, Katherine Ciak, of the
problem 0 Although Ciak confronted the boys, who promised to stop
their behavior, they did not cease the harassment."
Jane met with Ciak a second time in October and informed her parents
of the harassment shortly thereafter.32 Later that school year, Jane re-
ceived a pornographic drawing of herself showing one of the boys anally
penetrating her.33 In response, Jane's mother spoke with the school prin-
cipal, Nancy Meyers, who stated that no punishment would be forth-
coming due to an inconclusive investigation and told Jane's mother "that
such conduct was normal behavior for children in Jane's age group.
' 4
Jane gradually became extremely depressed and stopped eating and
sleeping well.35 Moreover, because the boys continued their sexually
harassing behavior without school intervention, Jane threatened to run
36
away and commit suicide. As a result, Jane's parents decided to remove
her from LJHS and enroll her in a private school, after which they
existence of a hostile environment, actual knowledge by the school of the hostile environ-
ment, and the intentional failure of the school district to take corrective action).
27. 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H. 1997).
28. See id. at 66.
29. See id. at 66-67. Specifically, the boys referred to Jane as a "slut," a "whore," and
a "f---ing bitch." See id. at 67.
30. See id. Hoping to ameliorate the situation on her own, Jane previously had asked
the boys to stop their conduct, but they only laughed and continued to taunt her. See id.
31. See id. On one occasion, "the boys pushed Jane into lockers and down the stairs,
knocked her books from her hands, and spat on her." Id. In addition, Jane began to re-
ceive numerous phone calls at home, during which male voices would call her a "bitch,
slut, and f---ing whore." Id. One of the boys later admitted to making one of the harass-
ing phone calls. See id. at 69.
32. See id. at 67. Prior to meeting with Jane's mother in November, Ciak told Jane to
"'stay away from' or 'ignore' the boys. Id. Ciak subsequently told Jane's mother that she
was "taking care of it." Id.
33. See id. at 68.
34. Id. When Jane's mother brought the sexually demeaning drawing of Jane to
Meyers, it became evident to Mrs. Doe that Meyers had not even been informed of the
incident prior to their meeting. See id.
35. See id. at 67. She also began to do poorly in school and participated less in extra-
curricular activities. See id. At one point, instead of investigating Jane's complaints, Mey-
ers allegedly suggested that the matter be dropped. See id. at 68 n.6.
36. See id. at 69.
[47:13631370
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brought suit on their daughter's behalf against the Londonderry school
district under Title IX.
37
Denying the school district's motion for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court analyzed when and to what extent school districts may be
found liable under Title IX.3 ' The court reviewed OCR policy guide-
lines,39 other federal court decisions,4° and analogous case law under Title
VII4 and concluded that a school district may be found liable only if it
had actual knowledge of a hostile environment and intentionally failed to
remedy the situation.42 Although the court conceded that it owed con-
siderable deference to the OCR,43 which emphatically adopted the
"knows or should have known" standard for extending liability only
three months earlier," it nonetheless adopted a stricter approach.4' To
date, only three federal district courts and one federal circuit court have
adopted a test with the protective stance advocated by the OCR as ap-
propriate in peer sexual harassment cases.46
37. See id. at 69-70. Even after Jane enrolled in a private school, she continued to
suffer from the effects of the sexual harassment. See id. at 69. Not only did her grades
continue to decline, but she also attempted suicide and subsequently underwent counsel-
ing due to her lingering feeling of betrayal by the school district. See id.
38. See id. at 71.
39. See id. at 72, 75 (referring to the OCR's Sexual Harassment Guidance to find that
the OCR has concluded that peer sexual harassment may violate Title IX and that a
school district can be held liable if it "knows or should have known of the harassment and.
•. fails to take immediate and appropriate [] action").
40. See id. at 73 (explaining that the tests for establishing school district liability have
varied among the federal courts, but generally adhere to either a "rigorous," "moderate,"
or "expansive" approach).
41. See id. at 72-73 (noting that although Title VII sexual harassment principles have
been useful guides, courts generally adopt more flexible standards recognizing the differ-
ences between sexual harassment between coworkers in the workplace and between stu-
dents in the school environment).
42. See id. at 74 (construing the "moderate approach" as the best resolution to "bal-
ance the competing concerns relevant to school district liability under Title IX in the peer
sexual harassment context").
43. See id. at 72 (analyzing the OCR's interpretation of peer sexual harassment
claims under Title IX).
44. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (1997).
45. See Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 74 (stating that modifying traditional Title VII
standards to require that a school district "must have intended to create a hostile educa-
tional environment" before imposing liability best resolves the question of when a school
district should be held liable for peer sexual harassment) (emphasis omitted).
46. See generally Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 475-76
(D.N.H. 1997) (adopting the same test as the OCR, despite the contrary ruling in the
Londonderry case in the same district only two months earlier); Franks ex rel. H.B.L. v.
Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 748 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (employing the "knew
or should have known" standard to determine whether peer sexual harassment occurred in
a school district); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal.
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This Comment will first explain the statutory development of Title IX
and its relationship to Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Next, this Comment will address the judicial evaluation of Title
VII and how courts have applied its principles to Title IX jurisprudence.
This Comment will then compare the various approaches constructed by
the courts to assess whether Title IX imposes liability on school districts
for failing to remedy peer sexual harassment and the corresponding ra-
tionale for each approach. Finally, this Comment will argue that in light
of Title IX's asserted purpose, case law which has developed under the
statute, public policy, and the OCR's clear stance espoused in its Sexual
Harassment Guidance, courts should apply strict Title VII standards to
cases of peer sexual harassment under Title IX.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX
Congress enacted Title IX to protect individuals from sex discrimina-
tion in educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance.47
Prior to Title IX's enactment, two avenues existed by which individuals
could seek redress to remedy discriminatory treatment.48 The first option
was for the affected individual to file a grievance under Title VI, which
1996) (adopting the Title VII policy that imposes liability for intentional discrimination
where the entity knows or should have known of circumstances that gave rise to the dis-
crimination); see also Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a
Kiss: Title IX and Student-to-Student Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 454-56
(1997) (supporting the Title VII "knows or should have known" standard of finding school
districts liable for failing to remedy peer sexual harassment); Chantal N. Senatus, Note,
Peer Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Where's the In-
tent?, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 379, 402, 408 (1997) (advocating an actual and constructive
notice standard in peer sexual harassment suits under Title IX). Two federal circuit courts
have ruled explicitly on the issue of school district liability in the context of peer sexual
harassment and have rejected the Title VII approach. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch.
Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.) (requiring a school to respond to claims of sexual har-
assment using different standards based on the sex of the complainant), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 165 (1996); Davis 11, 120 F.3d 1390, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (overturning the circuit's
earlier decision to adopt strict Title VII standards in accordance with OCR policies on the
basis that Congress failed to notify specifically school districts that they could be liable for
the sexual harassment of one student by another).
47. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1994). Senator Birch Bayh, a staunch Title IX proponent,
declared that Title IX "is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if
we are to provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training
for later careers, and as they seek employment commensurate to their education." 118
CONG. REC. 5803, 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (advocating the need for Title
IX legislation).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (providing a cause of action for discrimination in
any federally-funded program); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (creating a cause of action
for employment discrimination).
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prohibited discrimination in all federally-funded programs.49 The statute,
however, did not include gender as a prohibited classification, and there-
fore, excluded claims based on sex. 0 The second means of challenging
discrimination was under Title VII, which prohibited sex discrimination
in the workplace.5 The language of this provision, however, originally
exempted educational institutions from its scope.52 Thus, victims of sex-
ual discrimination in federally-funded academic programs had no way to
seek redress for the harm.53 Congress enacted Title IX to fill the gap be-
tween Title VI and Title VII by extending a remedy to those who suffer
sex-based discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal
funding.-' Unfortunately, Title IX fails to specify the criteria for estab-
lishing a sex discrimination claim or the method by which a person can
bring suit to challenge such discrimination.55 Thus, fashioning case law to
49. See 42 U.S.C. §2000d.
50. See id. (prohibiting discrimination based on classifications of "race, color, or na-
tional origin" by federal aid recipients).
51. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (stating that "[ilt shall be [] unlawful ... for
an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
52. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 524 (1982) (discussing how
the 1972 amendments attempted to extend coverage of Title VII to educational institu-
tions); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting leg-
islative history to assert that Title IX's purpose was to remove those aggrieved in educa-
tional programs receiving federal funding from Title VII's exemption); H.R. REP. No. 92-
554 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512 (stating that Title VII excluded edu-
cational institutions from its scope).
53. See Gregory E. Karpenko, Note, Making the Hallways Safe: Using Title IX to
Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (1997) (recognizing the
failure of Titles VI and VII to protect women who suffer from discrimination in educa-
tional institutions that receive federal financial assistance).
54. See 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994); Eriksson, supra note 2, at 1803 (emphasizing that
Congress intended to fill the gap between Title VI and Title VII by enacting Title IX).
55. See 20 U.S.C. §1681 (providing no procedure by which a claim should be brought
under the statute). Although the legislative history made clear that Title IX applies to
sexually discriminatory admission and employment practices, it does not resolve the issue
of peer sexual harassment. See generally 118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5803 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Bayh) (stating that the crux of Title IX is to ban sex discrimination in areas such as
admission policies and scholarships associated with federally-funded educational pro-
grams). Consequently, courts have received limited guidance in assessing sexual harass-
ment claims brought under Title IX. See Karpenko, supra note 53, at 1275 (stating that
courts initially lacked congressional guidance for determining the necessary standards to
establish a sexual harassment claim under Title IX); Jill Suzanne Miller, Note, Title VI and
Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 714-15 (indicating the lack of guidelines in Title IX's mandate as to
the criteria necessary to maintain an action for sex discrimination against educational insti-
tutions).
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compensate for the Title IX shortcomings requires analogizing Title VI
and Title VII principles and applying them to Title IX claims. 6 The issue
of peer sexual harassment, however, has caused significant complications
for judicial analysis because it is a unique situation that is not directly
comparable to other statutorily-defined prohibited behavior.7
A. Title VI's Relationship to Title IX
1. Similar Statutory Interpretations
Although sex discrimination inquiries under Title IX usually invoke
comparisons to Title VII principles, 8 the Supreme Court generally con-
siders Title IX to be an offspring of Title VI.59 Adopting this position,
the Court compared the statutory language of Title IX to that of Title VI
and noted that the statutes closely resemble each other, except that Title
VI excludes sex as a prohibited classification. 6° The fact that the lan-
56. See Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (asserting that
courts should analyze Title IX by analogizing already developed Title VI and Title VII
case law).
57. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (finding that Congress
intended for courts to base liability under Title VII on an agency theory). By contrast,
Title IX claims dealing with employee-on-student sexual harassment are directly analo-
gous to Title VII employment-related claims, and therefore, courts have little difficulty
forming appropriate standards to establish liability in this context. See Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (utilizing Title VII standards to determine
the liability of a school district when a teacher sexually harasses a student); Lipsett v. Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (using Title VII standards to ana-
lyze a Title IX sexual harassment claim brought by an employee-trainee against a supervi-
sor). Ordinarily, Title VII liability is imputed to an employer for the sexual harassment of
an employee by either a supervisor or fellow employee via agency principles. See Meritor,
477 U.S. at 72 (stating that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guid-
ance in this area"); infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing Meritor's analysis
of agency principles in Title VII employment cases). However, the situation where a stu-
dent sexually harasses another student is problematic due to the absence of an agency re-
lationship between the student and the school district. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §219(1) (1958) (stating that the master/servant relationship pro-
vides the basis for the master's liability). But see Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist.,
992 F. Supp. 467, 477, (D.N.H. Aug. 25, 1997) (noting that employer liability in the context
of hostile environment sexual harassment claims is not based on agency principles, but in-
stead is a form of "direct" liability arising from the employer's knowing failure to correct
workplace harassment).
58. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896 (comparing standards developed under Title VII to
Title IX); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311,
316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging Title VII "as the most appropriate analogue when
defining Title IX's substantive standards").
59. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (confirming that
Congress purposefully patterned Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
60. See id. at 694-96 (stating that "[b]oth statutes provide the same administrative
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guage of these two statutes is almost identical illustrates Congress's in-
tent to model Title IX after Title VI." In addition, the Supreme Court
has interpreted Title IX and Title VI in a similar manner.62
2. Remedies
Congress enacted Title VI and Title IX pursuant to its Spending
Clause power." This power allows Congress to compel institutions re-
ceiving federal funding to comply with certain conditions attached to the
allocation of this aid.64 Thus, the prohibition of discrimination under Ti-
tle VI and Title IX is a condition that federal aid recipients must "volun-
tarily and knowingly" accept before becoming eligible to receive funds.65
As a result of this pseudo-contractual relationship between Congress
and the funded institution, the recipient's liability for violating a Spend-
ing Clause statute is ordinarily limited; therefore, declaratory and injunc-
tive relief traditionally have been the only remedies available to ag-
grieved plaintiffs.66 However, in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
mechanism for terminating federal financial support for institutions engaged in prohibited
discrimination"); Compare 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1994) ("[N]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."), with 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance.").
61. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 697-98 (presuming that Title IX should be interpreted in
the same manner as Title VI). See generally 34 C.F.R. §106.71 (1997) (providing that Title
VI procedures are incorporated into the provisions of Title IX).
62. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99 (equating the characteristics of Title VI and Title
IX to support the finding of an implied Title IX right of action similar to the right already
afforded under Title VI).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. The Spending Clause is an enumerated power that
gives Congress the ability "[t]o lay and collect Taxes.... to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." Id.; Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (affirming Title IX's status
as a Spending Clause statute).
64. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (equating
the attachment of conditions before an entity can receive federal funds via Spending
Clause legislation with the duties that one incurs under a contract).
65. See id. (explaining that federal aid recipients cannot be forced to comply with ad-
ditional obligations mandated by courts under a Spending Clause statute, but must have a
choice either to accept the conditions or to forego federal funds).
66. See idt at 28-29 (finding that federal grant recipients are not required to give
money to plaintiffs under Spending Clause agreements for unintentional violations). The
reason for not allowing monetary damages in the case of an unintentional violation is that
the recipient of federal funds lacks notice that it could be held liable for a money award.
See id. at 17. Those receiving assistance under the Spending Clause do not consider the
possibility of private actions as a condition of the receipt of funds. Cf id. at 28-29. Due to
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Commission of New York,7 the Supreme Court extended the remedies
available under Title VI to include compensatory damages if a plaintiff
successfully establishes intentional discrimination.6 ' Thus, if the plaintiff
is unable to prove the existence of intentional discrimination, the plain-
tiff will be entitled only to the traditional remedy of injunctive relief.69
Although the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University of Chicago0
ruled that Title IX allows a plaintiff an implied private right of action, the
Court still refused to recognize, as it did in the context of Title VI, com-
pensatory damages as a proper form of relief in Title IX disputes.7 The
Court's initial reservation to adopt this holding set the stage for its land-
mark decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,72 which ex-
panded on the Court's previous decisions in the Title VI Guardians As-
sociation case and the Title IX Cannon case. In Franklin, a high school
student sued her local school district after repeated episodes of sexual
harassment, which culminated ultimately into coerced intercourse.73  A
unanimous Court held that a student could seek monetary damages for
an intentional violation of Title IX.74 Pursuant to Spending Clause juris-
the contractual nature of the Spending Clause agreement, the Supreme Court, in the past,
granted only injunctive relief and never ordered a grant recipient to pay a monetary award
to a plaintiff. See id. at 29.
67. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
68. See id. at 606-07.
69. See id. at 607. Seven members of the Court supported the conclusion that a viola-
tion of Title VI required proof of discriminatory intent to justify a reward of compensatory
damages. See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining the Court's disagreement
over the issue of intent).
70. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
71. Cf. id. at 704-05 (finding a private cause of action under Title IX, but acknowl-
edging that the only available remedy was injunctive relief, which denies financial aid to
the recipient who engages in sexually discriminatory conduct).
72. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
73. See id. at 63 (noting that the coerced intercourse occurred on several occasions).
The alleged harassment in Franklin involved questions about the victim's sexual experi-
ences, her willingness to have sex with an older man, forcible kissing on the mouth, tele-
phone calls to the victim's home, and forcible intercourse with the harasser. See id. The
complainant also alleged that although teachers and administrators knew of the harass-
ment, they did nothing to stop the conduct. See id. at 64.
74. See id. at 76. In deciding the sole issue of what remedies were available in a suit
brought pursuant to an implied private right of action under a Spending Clause statute,
the Court stated that the notice problem of Spending Clause grants does not arise in cases
of intentional discrimination. See id. at 74-75.
Moreover, the Court noted that Title IX places a duty on school districts to ensure sex
discrimination does not occur, and since sexual harassment of a subordinate by a supervi-
sor in employment situations is considered sex discrimination, the same rule should apply
when addressing sexual harassment of students by teachers. See id. at 75. The Court fur-
ther stated that Congress "did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support
the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe." Id.
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prudence, which allows monetary relief for intentional violations,' 5 and
absent any clear statement from Congress on the issue, the Court fash-
ioned an appropriate remedy for the federal statutory cause of action.76
The Court reasoned because Congress was silent on the subject, a pre-
sumption existed that Congress intended to afford plaintiffs all available
remedies." Although it clarified the remedy question, the Court's deci-
sion in Franklin created considerable confusion as to the necessary proof
a plaintiff must demonstrate to satisfy the intentional discrimination re-
quirement when bringing a suit against a school district for compensatory
relief.7 Consequently, courts generally analogize principles established
in Title VII workplace sexual harassment case law to mold an appropri-
ate test in Title IX claims."
B. Using Title VII Principles for Guidance under Title IX
1. The Development of Title VII
Title VII's legislative history offers limited assistance when interpret-
ing the statute, primarily because the House of Representatives added
gender as a prohibited classification to Title VII only moments before
75. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981).
76. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 68 (acknowledging that "all appropriate relief is avail-
able in an action brought to vindicate a federal right when Congress has given no indica-
tion of its purpose with respect to remedies"). Furthermore, in its assessment of available
remedies, the Court did not focus on the constitutional provision by which Congress en-
acted Title IX because it concluded that the source of legislation was irrelevant to the
question of remedies. See id. at 75 n.8.
77. See id. at 73. The fact that Congress remained silent on the subject of remedies
after the Court in Cannon held that Title IX affords plaintiffs a private cause of action,
illustrated Congress's intent not to limit remedies in Title IX suits. See id. at 72-73. Thus,
the Court upheld the traditional presumption in favor of any appropriate remedy, absent
direction from Congress. See id. at 73; supra text accompanying notes 75-76 (noting the
longstanding power of federal courts to provide appropriate remedies in the absence of
congressional direction).
78. Compare Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (concluding that because discriminatory intent is implicit in a hostile environment
cause of action, liability may attach to a school district based on an actual or constructive
notice standard), with Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997)
(extending liability to a school district based on an actual notice standard alone, coupled
with a specific demonstration of discriminatory intent); Karpenko, supra note 53, at 1283-
84 (discussing the Franklin Court's decision making damages available for intentional
violations of Title IX and the subsequent disagreement in the federal courts over the issue
of intent).
79. See supra note 15 (listing cases that have used Title VII principles to evaluate Ti-
tle IX claims).
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voting on the bill." Consequently, courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing
Title VII, began to determine independently the elements that amount to
sex discrimination." Accordingly, the EEOC issued guidelines recog-
nizing that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited
by Title VII, and defined two types of harassment that could result in
violations of the statute.82 These two categories are referred to as "quid
pro quo" sexual harassment and "hostile environment" harassment." An
employer commits quid pro quo sexual harassment when he or she con-
ditions either a prospective job benefit or continued employment on the
employee's acceptance of sexual conduct by the employer, whether en-
tailing verbal abuse or actual sexual acts.8 In contrast, hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment does not require that any conditions be placed
on employment; rather, the effect of the conduct must unreasonably in-
terfere with the employee's work performance or intimidate the em-
ployee to such a substantial degree that a hostile or offensive working
80. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-2584 (1964); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (explaining that opponents of adding sex as a prohibited classifica-
tion were defeated in the waning moments before the vote, allowing Congress to pass the
bill with a prohibition on sex-based discrimination). Meritor explained that those opposed
to the addition of sex to the list of prohibited classifications under Title VII viewed sex
discrimination as different from other forms of discrimination and thus, in need of inde-
pendent legislation. See id.
81. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67 (discussing the proper interpretation of Title IX's
prohibition against sex discrimination in light of its limited legislative history); 29 C.F.R.
§1604.11(a) (1997) (setting forth the EEOC's description of what constitutes sexual har-
assment).
82. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a). The EEOC guidelines specifically delineate what con-
stitutes illegal sexual discrimination:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) sub-
mission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such indi-
vidual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.
Id.; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (explaining the difference between quid pro quo sexual
harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment).
83. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (discussing the EEOC guidelines and noting that "Ti-
tle VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult").
84. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a) (illustrating situations that would constitute sexual har-
assment); cf. Meritor 477 U.S. at 64 (assuming that Title VII covers the typical quid pro
quo scenarios where sex discrimination is conditioned on "economic" or "tangible" loss, in
contrast to hostile environment situations where the loss is merely psychological).
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environment results." Such conduct may be in the form of "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature."'
Although courts quickly recognized quid pro quo sexual harassment as
a violation of Title VII,87 they failed to acknowledge the more ambiguous
hostile environment sexual harassment as constituting impermissible sex
discrimination until five years after the recognition of quid pro quo har-
assment.n In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,89 the Supreme Court both
endorsed the EEOC guidelines defining sexual hostile environment
claims and approved lower court rulings when it held that both quid pro
85. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (explaining hostile environment sexual harassment as
not being linked to economic benefits or employment status).
86. 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(a); see also Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 90 (1992) (listing "sexual jokes, remarks, physical contact, or porno-
graphic displays" as examples of hostile environment sexual harassment).
In its discussion of how to determine whether certain conduct is "unwelcome," the
Meritor Court refused to examine the "voluntariness" of the victim's behavior, and fo-
cused instead on the harasser's conduct. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. The Court held that
regardless of the victim's consent to the relationship, an examination of the entire record
could show that the behavior was unwelcome because it was a response to the supervisor's
position of power and ability to take away employment. See id. at 68-69. Evidence of
sexually provocative speech or dress on the part of the victim, however, may be relevant to
the overall analysis of welcomeness. See id. at 69 (citing EEOC guidelines for the proposi-
tion that "the record as a whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of
the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred" determine
whether sexual harassment exists).
87. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an em-
ployer could be found liable for a male supervisor's decision to fire a female employee be-
cause she refused the supervisor's demand for sexual favors); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) (deciding that a retaliatory firing because of an employee's
refusal to agree to a supervisor's sexual demands constituted sex discrimination under Ti-
tle VII), vacated on other grounds sub. nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
88. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66 (noting that judicial authority supported the right
of employees "to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult"); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that dis-
crimination may exist without the loss of any tangible job benefits if the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" have been affected). The recognition of a Title VII cause of
action for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim derived from an earlier decision
that dealt with a racially discriminatory work environment. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that Title VII "is an expansive concept that sweeps within
its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination"). The court in Rogers found that an offensive work envi-
ronment for a Hispanic complainant created by an employer by giving discriminatory
service to its Hispanic clientele may constitute a violation of Title VI! and, thus, Title VII
protects "employees' psychological as well as economic fringes.., from employer abuse."
See id. at 236,238.
89. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment were
actionable under Title VIIVO Specifically, the Court stated that sexual
harassment is actionable if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment."' 9
The Court refuted the assertion, however, that employers are auto-
matically liable for sexual harassment committed by their employee su-
pervisors." The Court found that Congress's definition of "employer" as
"any 'agent' of an employer" illustrated its intent to limit employer li-
ability under Title VII to discriminatory conduct perpetrated by those
acting within the scope of an agency relationship.9" Nonetheless, the
Court further reasoned that although an employer could be automati-
cally liable in cases where he or she actually delegated authority to a su-
pervisor, the usual agency relationship is obscured in cases resting exclu-
sively on a hostile environment sexual harassment claim." In the
situation where a supervisor makes or threatens to make discriminatory
decisions regarding the continued employment of his subordinates, the
Court posited that the actions of the supervisor can be imputed to the
employer who empowered him to carry out such responsibilities, re-
90. See id. at 64-66. One lower court, the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. Dundee, de-
clared that:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace
that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or
woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed
to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest
of racial epithets.
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing the effects of hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX in relation to those of racial harassment under Title VI).
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). The Supreme Court
adequately addressed the level of severity required for conduct to become sexual harass-
ment. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993). The Court in Harris
concluded that to determine whether a hostile environment exists required both an objec-
tive and subjective perception of abusiveness. Cf id. at 22. The Court reversed the lower
court's decision, cautioning that a discriminatory abusive work environment need not af-
fect the employee's "psychological well-being" per se to satisfy Title VII standards. See id.
at 22. Indeed, if an employee had not yet experienced a nervous breakdown, it did not
mean that the alleged sexual misconduct caused the employee no harm. See id. Rather,
the Court noted, a hostile or abusive environment must be determined by looking at the
totality of the circumstances. See id. at 23.
92. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63, 72 (rejecting the appellate court's holding that an em-
ployer should be strictly liable because "a supervisor is an 'agent' of his employer for Title
VII purposes").
93. See id. at 72; infra note 95 (discussing the EEOC's method of holding employers
liable for the acts of its agents).
94. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71.
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gardless of the employer's knowledge of the supervisor's conduct."
However, the Court noted that in hostile environment sexual harassment
claims, this fundamental agency principle disappears, because the super-
visor's actions are not the result of any delegation of authority, and thus,
the employer lacks notice of the supervisor's conduct.96 Nonetheless, the
Court cautioned that an employer who lacks notice of the existence of
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not guaranteed protection from li-
ability.97
Unfortunately, the Meritor Court did not establish specifically the cri-
teria necessary for a showing of employer intent or the level of notice re-
quired under Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment claims."
Since Meritor, however, federal courts agreed that a plaintiff alleging
hostile environment sexual harassment must demonstrate that:
(1) [the plaintiff] belongs to a protected group; (2) [the plaintiff]
was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harass-
ment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) [the employer]
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take proper remedial action."
Thus, an employer may be liable for the acts of a low-level employee
or third party if the plaintiff can show that the employer knew or should
95. See id. Although the EEOC often deems employers liable for the acts of its
agents in the absence of any notice, it still requires examination of "the circumstances of
the particular employment relationship and the job [functions] performed by the individ-
ual in determining whether an individual acts in ... [an] agency capacity" before strictly
adhering to such a rule. 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(c) (1997).
96. Cf. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71. (discussing the applicability of agency principles to
employer liability).
97. See id. at 72.
98. See id. (denying the imposition of absolute liability on employers for the acts of
supervisors, but failing to clarify when liability could be imposed). The Court avoided a
decision on the issue of employer liability due to the inconclusiveness of the record, which
was insufficient to determine whether sexual harassment had occurred. See id. In two re-
cent decisions, however, the Supreme Court addressed employer liability for sexual har-
assment committed by a supervisor and held that an employer may be vicariously liable
when a sexually hostile environment is created by a supervisor, regardless of the em-
ployer's knowledge, subject to the employer's ability to raise a two-part affirmative de-
fense. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998) (explaining that
this holding satisfies both Meritor's recognition of common agency principles as relevant
to a Title VII inquiry and its assertion that employer's may not be automatically liable for
hostile environment sexual harassment in the workplace); Burlington Indus. Inc., v. El-
lerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998) (same); see also Part I.B.1. (espousing the necessary
elements that comprise an employer's affirmative defense in a Title VII suit alleging hos-
tile environment sexual harassment created by a supervisor).
99. Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (delineating
the elements of a successful hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII).
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have known of the hostile environment, but failed to take appropriate
corrective action.'0° In the context of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment in the workplace committed by a supervisor, however, the Supreme
Court held recently that an employer may be vicariously liable, regard-
less of the employer's knowledge of the harassment, subject to the estab-
lishment of a two-prong affirmative defense: (1) "that the employer exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and ([2]) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." '
2. Application of Title VII to Title IX
Courts typically refer to Title VII case law when addressing alleged
violations of Title IX due to Title IX's failure to enunciate an appropri-
ate standard of analysis. °' For instance, the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut in Alexander v. Yale University"°3 decided
that quid pro quo sexual harassment provides a cause of action under Ti-
tle IX as it does under Title VII, °4 since Title VII's prohibitions deal with
100. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d
Cir. 1995) (contrasting a finding of liability where a supervisor acts pursuant to delegated
authority to sexually discriminate against an employee with liability where an employer,
with knowledge, merely allows a sexually hostile environment to exist in the workplace);
EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the "pre-
vailing trend of the case law" supports a finding that employers can be liable for failing to
correct a hostile work environment of which they have notice); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988) (restating the elements of a hostile work environ-
ment harassment claim); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir.
1986) (adopting the "knew or should have known" standard for employer liability).
101. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The Court proceeded to
explain that neither proof of "an antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure" insti-
tuted by the employer nor a showing of an employee's "unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer" is always dispositive of the elements con-
tained in the affirmative defense, but may be addressed accordingly. Faragher, 118 S. Ct.
at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The Court warned, however, that the affirmative de-
fense is available only "[w]hen no tangible empolyment action is taken." Faragher, 118
S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. Thus, "[n]o affirmative defense is available ...
when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as dis-
charge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Ellerth, 118
S. Ct. at 2270.
102. See supra note 15 (listing cases that have applied Title VII standards to Title IX
claims).
103. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), afj'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. See id. at 4-5 (stating that "academic advancement conditioned upon submission
to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as questions of job re-
tention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have become increasingly
recognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex discrimination in employ-
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types of harassment similar to those in Title IX cases."5 Several years
later, the Supreme Court declared that courts should accord Title IX "a
sweep as broad as its language" when interpreting Title IX's scope."6 As
a result, federal courts began to expand further the reach of Title IX by
applying the hostile environment theory of sexual harassment to disputes
involving employees against educational institutions receiving federal
funds.'07
In the first case to recognize the availability of a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim under Title IX, Lipsett v. University of PuertoR.108
Rico, the First Circuit applied Title VII analysis to a Title IX case in-
volving discriminatory acts of supervisors toward a female participant in
a surgical residency program conducted by a university medical school.' °9
The First Circuit, relying on the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Mabry v. State
ment"). Recognizing the increase in cases under Title IX, the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) subsequently issued its own memorandum, defining sexual harassment. See Row-
insky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.) (emphasis omitted) (citing
an OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Litigation, Enforce-
ment, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981)), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); See also supra note 7 and accompanying text (quoting the direct lan-
guage used in the definition of sexual harassment). The OCR's memorandum, however,
did not address specifically peer sexual harassment. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015 (dis-
cussing the applicability of agency interpretations to peer sexual harassment cases under
Title IX).
105. See Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 4 (comparing sex discrimination in educational set-
tings with sex discrimination in employment settings).
106. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)) (interpreting Congress's use of the phrase "no
person" in Title IX's statutory language to include discrimination of employees and stu-
dents).
107. See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d
311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (declaring that because Title IX is silent on an appropriate
standard and that Title VII prohibits the same behavior as Title IX, Title VII should guide
sexual hostile environment standards under Title IX); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of
Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67, n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (using Title VII hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment analysis to create a cause of action under Title IX), affd
mem., 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
108. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
109. See id. at 886, 897. Among the complaints in Lipsett, the plaintiff alleged that she
continually received inferior medical tasks because of her sex, that the supervisors made
numerous sexually explicit remarks in her presence, that she endured "sexually-charged"
nicknames, and that the supervisor told her on many occasions that he would institute a
"regime of terror" in order to rid the program of women. See id. at 887-88. Although the
plaintiff made formal complaints, the only response she received came from other resi-
dents who said they would protect her if she engaged in sexual relations with them. See id.
at 888. When she refused to succumb to sexual demands both from residents and two pro-
gram supervisors, they, in turn, "became unfriendly and even hostile." Id. The plaintiff
began to receive poor evaluations from the supervisors and subsequently received her dis-
charge from the residency program. See id. at 889.
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Board of Community Colleges & Occupational Education,"' other case
law,"' applicable EEOC guidelines,"2 and the legislative history of Title
IX,' held that an educational institution could be found liable if it knew
or should have known of a sexually hostile environment created by a su-
pervisor's behavior toward an employee-trainee and neglected to take
remedial action. Although Lipsett represented a pivotal step in the de-
velopment of Title IX jurisprudence, the First Circuit expressly limited
its holding to cover discrimination perpetrated by employees of educa-
tional institutions receiving federal aid."5 Lipsett did not resolve the is-
sue of peer sexual harassment claims against school districts, which were
relatively rare until 1992, when the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Public Schools"' granted plaintiffs the ability to seek mone-
tary damages in Title IX disputes."'
After the Court in Franklin decided that plaintiffs could seek money
110. 813 F.2d 311, 317 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[b]ecause Title VII prohibits
the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination," the court would con-
sider Title VII to be "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive
standards").
111. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896-97 (looking at case law to assess the appropriate stan-
dard to apply in Title IX sex discrimination cases); O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781
F.2d 632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986) (implying that Title VII and Title IX standards were the
same); Nagel v. Avon Rd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105, 106 (D. Conn. 1983) (same).
112. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (stating that the EEOC guidelines were useful be-
cause they instructed agencies to consider Title VII case law when determining alleged
violations of Title IX); 28 C.F.R. §42.604 (1997) (instructing courts to consider Title VII
case law when determining liability under Title IX for discriminatory employment prac-
tices).
113. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (stating that congressional intent supports the propo-
sition that "similar substantive standards" applied under both Title VII and Title IX). The
House of Representatives Report for the Education Amendments of 1972 asserted that
Title VII is one of the most important steps in the equal employment cause, although it
excluded educational institutions from its scope. See H.R. REP. No. 92-554, 2d Sess.
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512. The House Report concluded that Ti-
tle IX would correct this exclusion and cover "education under the equal employment
provision." Id.
114. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901. The Court reiterated that employers are not "always
automatically liable" for the sexually harassing behavior of their employees and that al-
though agency principles are a guide to finding liability, they are not absolutely determina-
tive. See id. at 900.
115. See id. at 897 (declaring that the court had "no difficulty extending the Title VII
standard to discriminatory treatment by a supervisor in [a] mixed employment-training
context," but that the court's holding "is limited to the context of employment discrimina-
tion").
116. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
117. See id. at 76 (1992) (extending the available relief for intentional violations of Ti-
tle IX); see also supra text accompanying note 74 (explaining that intentional discrimina-
tion must be shown in order to obtain monetary damages).
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damages to redress their harm, student-on-student sexual harassment
suits against school districts rose dramatically," 8 requiring a resolution of
a unique question and adding confusion to the relative clarity developed
in past Title IX decisions."9 Thus, courts were forced to address the bur-
den of proof required to secure a remedy against a school district for
failing to correct a sexually hostile environment created by one student
against another94  Most federal courts that have addressed the burden of
proof issue have differed as to whether a student seeking monetary dam-
ages under Title IX must meet the Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard of liability" or an actual notice threshold coupled with
a showing of intentional discrimination on the part of the school dis-
trict.22 At least one federal circuit completely rejected the applicability
118. See supra note 18 (listing peer sexual harassment cases to demonstrate a signifi-
cant increase after the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin).
119. Compare Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (re-
quiring that a school district have actual notice of peer harassment and intentionally dis-
criminate against the victim for it to be liable, even though the OCR's recently issued Sex-
ual Harassment Guidance advocated a different test), with Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997) (Davis II) (rejecting the applicability of stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment in Title IX claims), and Doe v. Oyster River Co-op.
Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467,475-76 (D.N.H. 1997) (adopting exact Title VII and OCR cri-
teria in a peer sexual harassment case only two months after the Londonderry decision in
the same federal district). For examples of cases that helped to develop a clear foundation
in Title IX jurisprudence, see Cannon v. University of Chic., 441 U.S. 677, 694-99 (1979)
(allowing individuals to bring a private cause of action under Title IX), and Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1993) (allowing compensatory damages for
actions brought under Title IX), and Lipset, 864 F.2d at 897 (extending liability to em-
ployers in a mixed employment-training context based on Title VII discriminatory treat-
ment standards). But see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2000
(1998) (holding, in a controversial five-to-four decision, that it will not extend liability to
school districts for sexual harassment committed by teachers against students, absent con-
gressional direction, unless there is actual notice to, and deliberate indifference by, an
"appropriate person").
120. See supra note 17 (discussing cases that addressed school liability in peer sexual
harassment claims).
121. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 958, 960
(4th Cir. 1997) (adhering to the Title VII "knew or should have known" standard of find-
ing liability in a Title IX hostile environment peer sexual harassment case); Davis v.
Monroe County Rd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996) (Davis I) (same), rev'd
en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 USLW 3387 (Nov. 19,
1997) (No. 97-843); Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 475-76
(D.N.H. 1997) (same); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 748 (E.D.
Ky. 1996) (same); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (same).
122. See Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,1419-20 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (modifying the Title VII approach by eliminating constructive knowledge as a
sufficient basis for the extension of liability); see also Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d
653,, 661 (7th Cir. 1998) (adopting an actual notice standard, but rejecting the need to
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of Title VII analysis, requiring instead that a student show that a school
district responded differently to complaints of sexual harassment based
on the sex of the complainant.' 2 Additionally, other courts have found
that peer hostile environment sexual harassment is not actionable under
Title IX. 24 Despite the differing decisions among the federal courts, the
Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari.
II. HOW TO EXTEND LIABILITY TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR
PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX: AN
UNRESOLVED ISSUE
Many federal courts have considered whether, and to what extent,
school districts may be found liable under Title IX for peer sexual har-
assment.'2 The vast majority of those courts have concluded that, in
some instances, school districts can be liable for failing to remedy a hos-
tile educational environment created by peer sexual harassment."6 Al-
show an extra element of intentional discrimination).
123. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
124. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Davis II) (finding that peer sexual harassment is not a valid claim under Title IX); Garza
v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that "a
student cannot bring a hostile environment claim under Title IX").
125. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
school district liability for peer sexual harassment); Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 (same);
Davis 1, 74 F.3d at 1189-90 (same); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 71-74
(D.N.H. 1997) (same); Piwonka v. Tidehaven Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.
Tex. 1997) (same); Collier v. William Penn. Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-14 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (same); Franks, 956 F. Supp. at 746-48 (same); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1417
(same); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1416-20 (same); Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kor-
tright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 176-77 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Burrow v. Post-
ville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Bosley v.
Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006,1020-23 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (same); Oona R.-S.
ex rel. Kate S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same),
affd, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. See, e.g., Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 (finding that Title IX covers peer sexual har-
assment when a school district treats complaints differently based on the sex of the com-
plainant); Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 74 (finding that Title IX covers peer sexual har-
assment when the school district knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to
correct the situation); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (finding that Title IX covers peer sex-
ual harassment based upon an actual notice standard). But see Davis II, 120 F.3d at 1406
(deducing that because Congress failed specifically to notify grant recipients of potential
liability for peer sexual harassment, the Spending Clause precluded such suits); Garza, 914
F. Supp. at 1438 (finding no right of action for peer sexual harassment under Title IX).
The Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky, however, effectively overruled the court's decision in
Garza. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 (accepting the possibility of school district liability
for peer sexual harassment, but only if the school district itself discriminated on the basis
of sex).
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though courts differ on the specific standards for establishing liability in
peer sexual harassment cases, n7 three basic models have emerged: (1) the
Rowinsky approach;1" (2) the actual notice and intentional discrimina-
tion approach;129 and (3) the "knew or should have known" approach.' 31
A. The Rowinsky Approach
The first basic approach to establishing school district liability essen-
tially rejects the applicability of Title VII analysis to peer sexual harass-
ment claims."' The Fifth Circuit, in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
School District,13 held that Title IX does not impose liability on school
districts for the sexual harassment of one student by another, absent a
showing that the school district itself, rather than the harassing student
alone, discriminated on the basis of sex. 13 3 Thus, for liability to arise, the
127. Compare Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 (holding that a school district must discrimi-
nate for liability to arise), with Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 661 (7th Cir. 1998)
(requiring that a school district "actually kn[olw" of the harassment before liability is im-
posed), and Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 960 (4th
Cir. 1997) (allowing the imposition of liability when a school district "knew or should have
known" of the harassment).
128. See infra Part II.A. (explaining the Rowinsky approach); see also Londonderry,
970 F. Supp. at 73 (calling the Rowinsky approach the "most rigorous").
129. See infra Part II.B.1. (explaining the actual notice and intentional discrimination
approach); see also Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 73 (describing the actual notice and in-
tentional discrimination approach as "more moderate").
130. See infra Part II.B.2. (explaining the "knew or should have known" approach); see
also Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 73 (describing the "knew or should have known" ap-
proach as the "most expansive").
131. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008 (concluding that Title IX did not impose liability
on a school district for peer hostile environment sexual harassment, unless the school dis-
trict itself engaged in sexually discriminatory conduct).
132. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
133. See id. at 1016. In Rowinsky, two sisters, Jane and Janet Doe, alleged that they
were the victims of numerous incidents of physical and verbal sexual harassment while
riding on the school bus. See id. The sisters alleged that one male student continually pat-
ted them on the buttocks as they passed by him on the bus and, on a few occasions,
grabbed their genital areas and breasts. See id. In addition, the male student frequently
asked the girls, "When are you going to let me f--k you?," "What bra size are you wear-
ing?," and "What size panties are you wearing?" Id. In response to this abuse, Jane and
Janet's parents met with school officials on numerous occasions, prompting the school to
suspend the male student from riding the bus for three days. See id. The episodes contin-
ued to occur after the boy returned, however, until the girls' mother removed them from
the bus and brought suit against the school district on behalf of her daughters. See id. at
1009-10.
The court explained that liability under Title IX could extend to a school district if the
district treated claims of sexual harassment brought by boys differently than those brought
by girls, or if it concentrated on sexual harassment of girls while ignoring similar attacks on
boys. See id Reasoning that the transferal of sexual harassment from the adult workplace
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school district would have to respond to claims of sexual harassment dif-
ferently based on the sex of the complainant.'14 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the issue was not whether an educational institution was li-
able under Title IX for failing to remedy peer sexual harassment, but
whether a school district receiving federal funds could be liable for sex
discrimination when the actual conduct in question is perpetrated by
someone other than the school district or its agents.
The majority evaluated several factors in reaching its conclusion, in-
cluding the scope of Title IX, its legislative history, and the OCR regula-
tions implementing Title IX 13 6 The majority determined that because
Congress enacted Title IX as an exercise of its spending power, the stat-
ute should be interpreted to apply only to acts of grant recipients or their
agents, and not to acts of third parties. 37 The majority also noted that
the legislative history illustrated that supporters and opponents of Title
IX focused their arguments specifically around liability for acts by grant
recipients, 13 and thus, the majority interpreted the OCR regulations as
setting to a situation involving children was problematic, and thus, the court opted to re-
ject the theoretical applicability of Title VII to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases. See
id. at 1011 n.ll.
134. See id. at 1016.
135. See id. at 1010. The court refuted the dissent's assertion that a student is an agent
of a school district by concluding that the school's power to discipline a student does not
create an agency relationship. See id. at 1010 n.9.
136. See id. at 1012-13 (indicating that three factors support the conclusion to impose
liability on school districts for only their own, or their agent's, actions).
137. See id. at 1013 (stating that the imposition of "liability for the acts of third parties
would be incompatible with the purpose of a spending condition, because grant recipients
have little control over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably violate the
prohibitions of title IX"). Although the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
declined to issue a definitive conclusion as to whether Title IX was enacted pursuant to
Congress' Spending Clause power, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless determined that three
reasons suggested that Title IX was a Spending Clause statute. See id. at 1012 n.14. First,
Title IX emulates the structure of Title VI, which is a Spending Clause statute. See id.
Second, the statute covers purely private academic institutions within its regulatory prohi-
bitions. See id. Finally, the Supreme Court rarely has attributed congressional intent to
act pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the only other poten-
tially applicable source of Title IX's authority. See id. Indeed, Title IX's language offered
nothing to suggest that Congress intended to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, and
thus, the language and structure indicated it was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause.
See id.
138. See id. at 1014. The court also recognized that the Supreme Court continually
acknowledged that Congress enacted Title IX to prohibit discrimination by federal grant
recipients. See id. at 1013 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704
(1979)). Furthermore, the court stated that "the value of a spending condition is that it
will induce the grant recipient to comply with the requirement in order to get the needed
funds," and that "[i]n order for the coercion to be effective, the likelihood of violating the
prohibition cannot be too great." Id. Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, imposing third
party liability on school districts would impede the value of the Spending Clause condi-
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not encompassing the behavior of third parties.'
To buttress its argument further, the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky elabo-
rated on the theoretical nature of sex discrimination, noting that the ap-
plication of sex discrimination developed in the adult workplace setting
to a situation involving the acts of children would be "highly problem-
atic."'" The court explained that because the theory of discrimination is
based on unequal power between the harasser and the harassed, it would
be illogical to employ this theory in a situation between two children."'
Indeed, the Court noted, in an educational setting, it is the school that
possesses the power, not the children."' According to the court, the rela-
tionship between the harasser and the victim in the context of peer sex-
ual harassment lacks the unequal power component necessary to impose
liability on a school district.' The court's discussion of unequal power,
however, only provided more support to those courts and commentators
who argue that the Rowinsky decision represented a fundamental mis-
understanding, due to its failure to recognize that liability in peer sexual
harassment cases is based on a school district's own actions in response
to the harassment. 44
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rowinsky is an extremely restrictive ap-
proach to extending liability to school districts for peer sexual harass-
145
ment. Most courts agree, however, that the holding in Rowinsky is not
tion, because the potentiality of a violation would increase significantly. See id.
139. See id. at 1015 (stating that the OCR's Policy Memorandum, which did not ade-
quately express a clear opinion regarding peer sexual harassment in schools, but concen-
trated on acts by employees or agents, was the clearest statement by the OCR on sexual
harassment). Although several other OCR documents, such as letters of finding, indicated
that Title IX should extend to peer sexual harassment, the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky stated
that these documents should be accorded little deference, because they were merely inter-
pretive regulations and not the result of "deliberate consideration of a rulemaking pro-
ceeding." Id.
140. Seeid. at 1011 n..
141. See id. (stating that "sexual harassment is 'the unwanted imposition of sexual re-
quirements in the context of unequal power') (quoting CATHERINE MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979)). The court also cautioned that
"[ujnwanted sexual advances of fellow students do not carry the same coercive effect or
abuse of power as those made by a teacher, employer or co-worker." Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. The court further rejected the applicability of Title VII analysis that found
employer liability for harassment committed by third parties because such cases dealt with
the power of the employer, which is absent in peer sexual harassment suits. See id.
144. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (explaining how the Rowinsky
holding was fundamentally flawed).
145. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 73 (D.N.H. 1997) (assessing
the various approaches that the federal courts have adopted to resolve the issue of a
school district's liability for peer sexual harassment and concluding that Rowinsky adopted
the "most rigorous" approach).
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only adverse to Congress' goal of providing a school environment free
from discrimination, but that it is also fundamentally flawed.46 Instead
of focusing on the school district's action or inaction in knowingly per-
mitting sexual harassment to persist in its hallways, courts believe that
the Fifth Circuit stressed the school district's lack of participation in the
harassing conduct of its students. 147 Indeed, the court failed to recognize
that when a school district knowingly allows a hostile learning environ-
ment to continue unfettered, inaction may constitute actionable discrimi-
nation.'" Furthermore, at least one commentator has concluded that the
Fifth Circuit's reliance on Title IX's scope, legislative history, and regula-
tory treatment should have led the court to reach the opposite conclu-
sion-to allow the imposition of liability on school districts for the acts of
third parties.
49
146. See Doe v. University of II1., 138 F.3d 653, 662 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that Row-
insky "fundamentally misunderst[oo]d[]" the plaintiff's request, which was to hold the
school district "liable for its own actions and inaction in the face of its knowledge that the
harassment was occurring"); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132
F.3d 949, 958 (4th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that Rowinsky "results in a deeply flawed analy-
sis" because liability is the product of a school district's own actions, not those of stu-
dents); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (declar-
ing that "Rowinsky is manifestly based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature
of this type of claim" because liability attaches to a school district pursuant to its response,
or lack of response, to known sexual harassment); see also Sexual Harassment Guidance,
62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,048 n.27 (1997) (stating "that the Rowinsky decision misinterprets
Title IX," which holds school districts liable for their own actions in response to known
sexual harassment, and not for actions of students); Recent Case, Sexual Harassment-Ti-
tle IX-Fifth Circuit Holds School District Not Liable for Student-to-Student Sexual Har-
assment, 110 HARV. L. REv. 787, 790 (1997) (concluding that Rowinsky's "interpretation
of Title IX's scope rests on two false premises," namely that schools would be induced to
reject grants if they could be liable for acts of students and that liability would attach
automatically for incidents of peer sexual harassment).
147. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 958 (recognizing that Rowinsky failed to understand
that liability is the product of a school district's own actions, not those of students); Peta-
luma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421 (stating that Rowinsky did not recognize that Title IX holds
school districts liable for their own conduct in responding toward the existence of a hostile
educational environment, and not for the conduct of the harassing students themselves);
see also Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,048 n.27 (confirming that Title
IX holds a school district liable not for the actions of its students, but for its own inade-
quate response to a known sexually hostile environment within its programs).
148. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421.
149. See Recent Case, supra note 146, at 792. Three justifications existed for conclud-
ing that Title IX should impose liability on school districts for discriminatory acts of third
parties. See id. First, expanding the scope of Title IX to cover peer sexual harassment
would not greatly increase the risk of violating the statute's prohibitions; rather, it would
urge schools to deal with this significant problem that most have failed to address. See id.
Second, Supreme Court decisions indicated that Title IX should be read broadly when in-
terpreting its scope. See id. at 791. Finally, letters of finding issued by the OCR, which the
Rowinsky court accorded little deference, suggested clearly that the OCR interpreted Title
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B. Using Title VII As a Guide
Despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Rowinsky, most courts that have
considered the issue of hostile environment peer sexual harassment have
held that school districts may be liable for failure to remedy the hostile
environment.5 ° Similar to Title VII criteria for establishing the liability
of an employer who failed to take appropriate corrective action to rem-
edy a sexually hostile environment in the workplace, courts generally re-
quire a plaintiff to establish five elements in order to prevail: (1) that the
plaintiff belonged to a protected group;5' (2) that the plaintiff was the
victim of unwelcome sexual harassment while participating in an educa-
tional program or activity receiving federal financial assistance;112  (3)
that the harassment was based on sex;5 3 (4) that the harassment was so
severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of the plaintiff's educa-
IX as imposing liability on school districts for peer sexual harassment. See id. at 791-92.
This assertion is buttressed by the OCR's consistent position that a grant recipient may be
liable for third-party harassment; thus, the court should have given these documents
greater weight. See id. at 792.
150. See, e.g., Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (con-
cluding that, in some instances, school districts may be liable under Title IX for failing to
remedy the existence of hostile environment sexual harassment caused by their students);
Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same); Wright
v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same).
151. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (listing the elements of an actionable Title IX
claim for peer sexual harassment).
152. See id.; Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo.
1995). An important consideration in determining whether particular conduct was unwel-
come is whether the alleged victim requested the conduct and "regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive." Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040; see also
supra note 86 (explaining the court's discussion in Meritor concerning the proper way to
determine whether sexual conduct was "unwelcome"). The fact that a victim may acqui-
esce to conduct or does not complain is not necessarily dispositive as to whether the con-
duct was welcome. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040. Such acqui-
escence or failure to resist may be the result of fear perpetrated by the aggressor. See id.
The victim also may fail to object to a continual litany of disparaging sexual remarks for
fear that any objection would cause the harasser to increase his or her comments. See id.
Moreover, when inquiring about whether certain acts were unwelcome, courts should not
focus on the "voluntariness" of the victim's participation, but rather on whether the victim
indicated that the behavior was unwelcome. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
In addition, the OCR acknowledged that determining "welcomeness" in the school en-
vironment involved the consideration of such factors as the age of the student, the nature
of the conduct, and whether the student had the ability to "welcome" sexual conduct. See
Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040. Schools should accord special atten-
tion to situations in which the harasser is in a position of power over the victim, such as the
case of a teacher allegedly harassing a student, regardless of the apparent consensuality of
the relationship. See id.
153. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420. The Supreme Court has stated that harassment
of a person because of that person's sex constitutes discrimination based on sex. See
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
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tion and created a hostile or abusive educational environment; 14 and (5)
that some basis for institutional liability exists.'
In addition, due to the decision in Franklin, courts require some
showing that a school district's conduct constituted intentional discrimi-
nation.56 However, whereas some courts explicitly include intentional
discrimination as an extra part of the fifth element in the test,5 17 other
154. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at
1420; see also supra note 92 (discussing how to assess the severity of behavior in a sexually
hostile work environment claim). In the Title VII context, determining whether sexual
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile environment requires
consideration of the frequency and severity of the conduct, the threatening or humiliating
nature of the conduct, and whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the per-
formance of the student. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (applying
these factors in the employment context); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp.
1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (citing Harris's method of measuring whether conduct is suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive under Title VII and transferring it to a Title IX claim). These
factors must be evaluated on both an objective and subjective basis. See id. First, the se-
verity or pervasiveness of the conduct should first meet a reasonable person standard of
review. See id. Second, the court should consider whether the plaintiff perceived the envi-
ronment as abusive. See id. If not, then the conduct has not caused a hostile environment
because it did not actually change the conditions of the environment. See id. In the school
setting, evidence of a change in a student's educational environment may be tangible, as
where a student's grades decrease, or intangible, as where attending school simply be-
comes more difficult for the student. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at
12,041.
The OCR reasoned in its policy guidance that a hostile environment is particularly evi-
dent when there is a pattern of harassing conduct or if the harassment is significant. See
id. Accordingly, the more repetitive the conduct, the more likely it will create a hostile
environment, even if the specific behavior viewed independently would not be severe
enough to satisfy the analysis. See id. A single incident that is sufficiently severe may it-
self be enough to establish a hostile environment, despite the lack of a constant and con-
tinual pattern of abuse. See id. Finally, a hostile environment may exist even when the
harassing behavior is not specifically directed at the complainant, but he or she witnesses
it. See id.
155. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1232; see also Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (requiring a
plaintiff attempting to establish institutional liability to show that the school district "knew
of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action"). But see Doe
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that institu-
tional liability could be established if the school district did not have actual knowledge, but
should have known of the hostile environment nonetheless, and failed to correct the situa-
tion).
156. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (al-
lowing monetary relief under Title IX where a school district engages in intentional dis-
crimination); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (recognizing the need to show intentional dis-
crimination on the part of a school district to receive monetary damages under Title IX);
Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020 (same).
157. See, e.g., Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (con-
cluding that a plaintiff must show that a school district actually knew of the hostile envi-
ronment and intentionally failed to respond to establish institutional liability for peer sex-
ual harassment under Title IX); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (same); Bosley, 904 F. Supp.
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courts refuse to make this addition because they believe proof of inten-
tional discrimination is implicit in the test as a whole and need not be
listed expressly.15 The fifth prong of this test is, thus, the one where
courts most often deviate from the Title VII standard in an attempt to
satisfy the Court's mandate in Franklin.59
1. The Actual Notice and Intentional Discrimination Approach
The majority of courts that recognize a cause of action under Title IX
for a school district's failure to remedy peer sexual harassment in its edu-
cational programs have modified the traditional Title VII approach to
require that schools actually know of the harassment and intentionally
fail to take proper remedial action for liability to exist. 60 Thus, to estab-
lish a basis for institutional liability, a plaintiff must offer a stricter dem-
onstration of culpability than the Title VII "knew or should have known"
standard. 161 Evidence that a school had mere constructive knowledge of
the harassment is insufficient to meet this threshold, even if the harass-
ment was adequately severe, persistent, or pervasive to create a hostile
environment.162
Although Title VII clearly allows for liability where employers fail to
correct a sexually hostile work environment created by low-level em-
ployees or third parties when they knew or should have known of the
harassment,'63 the majority of courts have relied instead on Franklin v.
at 1020 (same).
158. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653,661 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that a plain-
tiff need not "plead or prove that the recipient ... failed to respond as a result of sexually
discriminatory intent" because demonstrating "[t]he failure promptly to take appropriate
steps in response to known sexual harassment is itself intentional discrimination on the
basis of sex"); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1424 (finding that "intent is established by proof
of the elements required to prove the cause of action and needs no additional proof").
159. See infra Part II.B.1. (explaining the rationale used by courts that alter the Title
VII "knew or should have known" method of establishing liability).
160. See, e.g., Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 74 (concluding that a plaintiff must show
that a school district actually knew of the hostile environment and intentionally failed to
respond to establish institutional liability for peer sexual harassment under Title IX);
Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (same); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020 (same).
161. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in
Franklin mandates a stricter standard for finding liability than mere negligence).
162. See id (stating that a negligence standard is insufficient to impose liability on a
school district for peer sexual harassment under Title IX).
163. See Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269, (8th Cir. 1993) (deline-
ating the elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII); see
also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998) (adopting a standard
in the context of hostile environment sexual harassment created by a supervisor in the
workplace that, subject to an affirmative defense, is even less stringent than the "knew or
should have known" threshold). The "knew or should have known" standard of finding
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Gwinnett County Public Schools1"4 to conclude that more than simple
negligence must exist on behalf of a school district to hold it liable under
Title IX.'65 The Franklin Court observed that remedies are limited under
Spending Clause statutes for unintentional violations, because recipients
of federal funds may lack notice that they could be liable for monetary
damages. 66 Thus, Franklin required a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion to justify a monetary reward under a Spending Clause statute,'67
prompting courts to demand that a school district must have received ac-
tual notice of the harassment and intentionally failed to remedy the
situation in order to be found liable under Title IX.161 Some courts, thus,
seek to rectify the notice problem espoused in Franklin by requiring an
intentional discriminatory act on behalf of the federal grant recipient. 9
liability, however, may not satisfy the intent element when establishing that a school dis-
trict discriminated on the basis of sex. See Senatus, supra note 46, at 394. Although es-
tablishing discriminatory intent is clearer when a sexually hostile environment is created
by teachers, acts of students present a more difficult inquiry. See id. at 394 n.95.
164. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
165. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court's opinion in
Franklin explicitly demands more than mere negligence to create liability for monetary
damages for a violation of Title IX-it requires plaintiffs to show an intent to discrimi-
nate"). At least one federal court in California also determined that Franklin demanded a
showing of intentional discrimination before monetary damages would be allowed. See
Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 122
F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997). Such a determination resulted because Franklin elaborated on
the differences between intentional and unintentional violations. See id.
166. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (considering whether compensatory damages are
available to plaintiffs in a Title IX suit); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the limitation of remedies under Spending Clause statutes and the problem of no-
tice).
167. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74; see also supra note 64 (explaining that because of the
contractual nature of the Spending Clause, federal aid recipients need to know of potential
liability before being forced to pay monetary rewards).
168. See Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020-23 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(discussing Franklin's intentional discrimination requirement to justify the court's holding
that institutional liability will exist only if a school district had actual knowledge of the
harassment and intentionally failed to remedy the situation). Although the court asserted
that Title VII, which allows a finding of liability upon actual or constructive knowledge,
contains standards directly "adaptable to protect persons participating in federally sup-
ported educational programs from sex discrimination," it adopted the stricter actual notice
threshold nonetheless. Id. at 1023. The court in Bosley also opined that applying Title VII
standard in the context of Title IX best advances the congressional purpose of "not al-
lowing federal monies to be expended to support intentional invidious discrimination
based on sex." Id. Despite Bosley's enthusiastic espousal of the value of Title VII stan-
dards, the court nonetheless proceeded to adopt a more rigorous approach absent any ex-
planatory justification. See id. (requiring more than the Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard of establishing institutional liability in Title IX peer sexual harassment
cases).
169. See id. at 1021 (referring to the problem of permitting monetary damages for un-
intentional violations of Spending Clause statutes due to the notice problem); see also su-
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In determining the existence of discriminatory intent, courts are not
required to focus on whether the school treated complaints of sexual
harassment differently based on the complainant's gender; rather, courts
may infer intent based on the totality of the facts presented, including a
failure to take adequate steps to cease harassment, toleration of the har-
assment, and the severity of the harassing behavior.'7° Accordingly, "[i]f
the finder of fact makes these findings, the finder of fact may infer that
[the] defendant intentionally failed to take appropriate remedial action
because of [the] plaintiff's gender.''. Such failure itself could be circum-
stantial evidence of discriminatory intent.'72
pra note 66 (explaining that Spending Clause grants are like contracts between the gov-
ernment and the recipient, requiring notice before liability for monetary damages can
arise).
Certain courts essentially adhere to Franklin's use of the Title VII standards of liability
by implementing the remaining four elements of a Title VII hostile environment claim, but
altering Title ViI's "knew or should have known" standard to require actual knowledge.
See Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (espousing the elements for a claim involving peer sexual
harassment against a school district); see also supra notes 99 and accompanying text (stat-
ing the elements of a Title VII hostile environment claim against an employer). The court
in Bosley stated that "Franklin supports the conclusion that Title VII law provides stan-
dards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX." Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at
1022.
170. See Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D.
Iowa 1996) (distinguishing Rowinsky's analysis of the intent requirement); Bosley, 904 F.
Supp. at 1020-21 (discussing the element of intent needed for an award of compensatory
damages in a Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim); Oona, 890 F. Supp. at
1469 (finding that "discrimination may manifest itself in the active encouragement of peer
harassment, the toleration of the harassing behavior of male students, or the failure to
take adequate steps to deter or punish peer harassment"). The court in Bosley noted that
unlawful discrimination need not be the sole motive of a defendant to satisfy the intent
element, but that it is the "cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively
manifests discriminatory intent." Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1020 (citing United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court specifically found that dis-
criminatory intent could be inferred by showing that the plaintiff was a victim of unwel-
come sexual harassment, that the harassment was sex-based, that the harassment hap-
pened while the plaintiff was participating in a federally-assisted educational activity, and
that the school district had notice of the harassment and "intentionally" failed to remedy
the situation. See id. at 1023.
171. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023. The ability of courts to infer intent from a school
district's failure to remedy known sexual harassment within its educational system repre-
sents the main divergence between Rowinsky and other courts. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp.
at 1203-04 (stating that "unlike Rowinsky [I courts have allowed the trier to infer such in-
tent from the totality of proof"). Instead of permitting courts to establish intent through
inferences from the totality of the facts, Rowinsky required proof that the school district
behaved in an intentionally discriminatory manner by treating claims of sexual harassment
differently based on the gender of the complainant. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch.
Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
172. Cf. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1025 (indicating that a reasonable jury could conclude
that a school district intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff based on findings that
the school district knew of the harassment but failed to take corrective action).
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Courts adopting this approach generally maintain that modifying the
Title VII analysis to fit peer sexual harassment under Title IX not only
satisfies Franklin's intentional discrimination requirement, but also helps
to ameliorate the absence of an agency relationship between schools and
students by making it more difficult for liability to attach.173  If based
solely on agency principles, however, peer sexual harassment would not
invoke school district liability."' Nonetheless, the applicability of agency
principles in hostile environment cases is still ambiguous , 5 and most
courts hold school districts liable for their own action or inaction in fail-
ing to cure a known sexually harassing atmosphere.76
2. The "Knew or Should Have Known" Approach
Several federal courts have decided that student plaintiffs may estab-
lish institutional liability for peer sexual harassment under Title IX
strictly in accordance with Title VII standards. 177  For example, the
173. Cf Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(discussing the relationship between Franklin's "intentional discrimination" mandate and
the imposition of institutional liability via agency principles), reh'g granted, 949 F. Supp.
1415 (1997). One district court that allowed a peer sexual harassment claim under Title IX
believed that Franklin imputed liability to the school district based on agency principles,
making the district liable for the acts of its agents. See id. Moreover, at least one com-
mentator has contended that a school district cannot be held vicariously liable for peer
sexual harassment under Title IX, because third parties do not satisfy the definition of an
agency relationship. See Senatus, supra note 46, at 396 (outlining the arguments in opposi-
tion to the recognition of peer sexual harassment claims under Title IX). The Supreme
Court in Meritor, however, conceded that traditional agency principles are obscured in
hostile environment cases and, thus, may not be wholly applicable. See Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (reviewing the EEOC's discussion of agency principles in
hostile environment sexual harassment cases).
174. See Doe v. University of II., 138 F.3d 653, 662 (7th Cir. 1998) (conceding that a
university could not be liable under Title IX for discriminatory behavior of students if
based on agency principles); Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d
1014, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[a]gency principles ... cannot impute discrimina-
tory conduct of an employee to the 'program or activity"' under Title IX); Senatus, supra
note 46, at 396 (illustrating that third-party acts would never result in school district liabil-
ity if based solely on agency principles).
175. Cf. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-72 (noting that the theory of agency may not be appli-
cable to claims based solely on hostile environment sexual harassment but that "absence
of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability").
176. See, e.g., Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421 (noting that school district liability is
based on a school's inaction when confronted with a known sexually hostile environment);
Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205 (allowing a student who was forced to leave school and
graduate early due to peer sexual harassment to bring suit under Title IX against a school
district for failing to remedy a known hostile environment); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023
(confirming that Title IX imposes liability on school districts for their knowing failure to
remedy a hostile educational environment).
177. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 958, 960
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California in
Doe v. Petaluma City School District,17' determined that a school could be
held liable if it "knew, or should in the exercise of [its] duties have
known of the hostile environment" and failed to take remedial action.
The Petaluma court began its analysis by addressing the issue of in-
tent,' s recognizing Franklin's mandate that school districts may be liable
for monetary awards only when they discriminate intentionally on the
basis of sex, thereby giving these school districts sufficient notice of po-
tential liability.' Based on earlier Supreme Court precedent,182 the Pe-
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the "knew or should have known" standard of institutional
liability was appropriate in a Title IX case against a university for failing to take appropri-
ate remedial action in response to an alleged rape); Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist.,
992 F. Supp. 467, 475-76 (D.N.H. 1997) (adopting the Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard in a Title IX peer sexual harassment case involving junior high students);
Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 746-48 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (adopting
an actual or constructive notice standard in a Title IX peer sexual harassment suit alleging
that a female student was raped while under the auspices of the defendants' care at an
away track meet); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421 (adopting strict Title VII principles for
finding institutional liability in a Title IX action involving junior high students). Initially,
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Title IX allows a claim for hostile environment peer sexual
harassment based on the "knew or should have known" Title VII standard, but the court
has since overturned that decision. See Davis v. Monroe County Rd. of Educ., 74 F.3d
1186, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1996) (Davis I), rev'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
filed, 66 USLW 3387 (Nov. 19, 1997 (No. 97-843). Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit based
its first decision primarily on the Supreme Court's analysis of Title VII's applicability to
Title IX in Franklin and the Court's mandate to read Title IX broadly. See id. at 1190. In
addition, the court in Davis I supported its conclusion with ample public policy arguments
for affording students even greater protection from harassment than employees in the
workplace. See id. at 1193 (contending that sexual harassment can cause greater damage
in the classroom than in the workplace due to the age of the victims and the students' need
for proper emotional enhancement).
178. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
179. Id. at 1427. Another court, that initially adopted the "knew or should have
known" standard, garnered support for its findings by looking at a Second Circuit decision
that used Franklin to justify its application of Title VII standards in Title IX situations.
See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191 (stating that "[tihe [Franklin] Court's citation of Meritor, . . . a
Title VII case, in support of Franklin's central holding indicates that, in a Title IX suit for
gender discrimination based on sexual harassment of a student, an educational institution
may be held liable under standards similar to those applied in cases under Title VII")
(quoting Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,249 (2d Cir. 1995)).
180. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1422 (analyzing Franklin's use of the phrase "inten-
tional discrimination" to determine its application to peer sexual harassment).
181. See id.; supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the notice issue).
182. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 281-82 (1994) (construing the
1991 amendments to Title VII as implicitly including hostile work environment sexual
harassment within the definition of intentional discrimination). Landgraf is a Title VII
liability case involving co-worker sexual harassment. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248. In
examining the retroactivity of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, which permit rewards of
compensatory damages against employers, the Landgraf Court, according to Petaluma,
assumed that hostile environment discrimination is a form of intentional discrimination.
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taluma court concluded "that the hostile work environment cause of ac-
tion developed as a species of intentional discrimination.""' To buttress
this assertion, the Petaluma court compared the criteria for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment to the elements of disparate treatment, an
intentional discrimination type of sexual harassment, and found that the
two bear a close resemblance to one another)" Specifically, the court
illustrated that the first and third prongs of a hostile environment cause
of action require the same analysis as in a disparate treatment situation,
where discriminatory intent may be inferred, rather than proven di-
rectly. "' Moreover, the court construed Ninth Circuit cases as recogniz-
ing the Title VII "knew or should have known" standard of liability as an
intentional discrimination threshold and not a mere negligence stan-
dard.'86 Finally, the Petaluma court stated that there are two elements of
intent already in existence within a hostile environment analysis: the har-
asser's intentional conduct based on sex; and the institution's act of "im-
plicitly condoning" the conduct by "knowingly failing to take steps to
remedy it."'187 Thus, proof of the elements necessary to establish a suc-
cessful hostile environment cause of action fulfills the required inten-
tional discrimination component, rendering unnecessary any separate re-
See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1422. Petaluma noted that while no strict definition exists,
the amendments seem to define intentional discrimination "as any form of discrimination
other than 'an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact."' lI
(quoting 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (1991)). Furthermore, Petaluma cited Landgraf for the
proposition that the amendments create a new right to monetary relief for those who are
the victims of a hostile work environment, but who have not yet been discharged. See id.
183. Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1422.
184. See id. at 1422-23 (noting that disparate treatment discrimination requires a
showing of intentional discrimination, "whether by direct evidence or by inference").
Disparate treatment discrimination entails treatment of certain employees in a less favor-
able manner because of the employee's status as a member of a protected group. See id. at
1422.
185. See id. at 1423 (showing how both the hostile environment and disparate treat-
ment standards require that a perpetrator choose a victim according to his or her member-
ship in a particular group and contain provisions with respect to employer culpability).
186. See id.; see also Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir.
1986) (establishing an intentional discrimination threshold by finding that "failure to take
reasonable steps to prevent a barrage of racist acts, epithets, and threats can make an em-
ployer liable if management-level employees knew, or ... should have known about the
campaign of harassment").
187. Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1424. The court explained that, as in disparate treat-
ment cases, victims of hostile environment sexual harassment must be selected by harass-
ers as a result of gender, a protected group under Title VII. See id. at 1423. Finding intent
in a harasser's conduct is relatively simple, but finding intent where an employer implicitly
condones the conduct through a lack of response is more difficult. See id. The court
noted, however, that other cases employed the "knew or should have known" standard as
an intentional discrimination threshold. See id.
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quirement of intent in addition to a showing of actual or constructive no-
tice.'
To enhance the justification of this opinion, the court also endorsed
the Eleventh Circuit's language in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 9 espousing public policy reasons for the need to protect stu-
dents as much as workers.'O Specifically, the Petaluma court stated that
educational environments require protection from sexual harassment,
and that failure to provide such protection could prevent a harassed stu-
dent from fully developing his or her intellectual capacity.91 Citing vari-
ous statistics indicating that sexual harassment in schools is significantly
more prevalent than in the workplace, the court concluded that school
districts are therefore "on notice" that peer sexual harassment may very
well exist in their schools. 92 Consequently, school districts have a duty
not only to implement programs reasonably calculated to create aware-
ness of peer sexual harassment, but also to remedy cases of sexually hos-
tile conduct, about which they have reason to know, regardless of
whether the aggrieved students have filed official complaints.93
188. Cf id. (implying that no additional proof is needed to establish the intent re-
quirement of a hostile environment claim once the elements necessary for proving such a
claim are established).
189. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996) (Davis I), rev'd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.
1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 USLW 3387 (Nov. 19, 1997) (No. 97-843).
190. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1420 (discussing the Davis I court's reasoning for
adopting exact Title VII standards in Title IX peer sexual harassment suits).
191. See id. (relying on Davis I for the proposition that public policy supports the need
for enhanced protection of school children against sexual harassment by peers).
192. See id. at 1426 (citing statistics indicating that while over 40% of female federal
employees reported incidents of sexual harassment in 1980 and 1987, a 1993 study showed
that 85% of girls and 76% of boys reported experiences with similar abusive conduct in
school).
193. See id. The court rejected the school district's argument that the absence of a
separate requirement of intent on behalf of the school district would force the schools to
create an environment free of harassment, which it deemed an impossible task. See id.
The court reiterated that liability is not automatic and that Title VII principles, on which it
based its decision, would protect school districts from such a problem in three ways. See
id. First, liability only attaches when the harassment is so pervasive or severe as to deter
the plaintiff's ability to function in the educational environment. See id. Second, the
school district must know of the harassment, or, with the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, before liability is imposed. See id. Liability is not arbitrary, but will
attach only upon some proof that the situation was severe enough to make a reasonably
prudent school district aware of the harassment. See id. Finally, even if there is a hostile
environment within the school, a district can avoid liability by responding adequately to
correct the situation. See id. Schools are allowed reasonable leeway in adopting a method
they deem most effective to ameliorate each incident of sexual harassment. See id.
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III. THE OCR NOTIFIES SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF ITS POSITION,
BUT COURTS CONTINUE TO RELY ON FALSE PREMISES
In March 1997, the OCR issued a Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance
clarifying its position on peer sexual harassment in schools. 14 This guid-
ance officially addressed the OCR's opinion concerning the current dis-
parity among federal courts with respect to finding school district liability
in peer sexual harassment cases that is hindering the uniform protection
of student victims."' In light of the OCR's guidance, at least one com-
mentator has reasonably assumed that federal courts would begin to
adopt a unified position on the application of Title IX to peer sexual har-
assment claims. 96 This assumption appears to be flawed, however.19 7 De-
198spite the OCR's clear policy interpretation, courts continue to show re-sistance, either by modifying Title VII standards of liability, or by
194. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,034 (1997). This policy
guidance attempted to clarify the appropriate standards that the OCR uses to investigate
and resolve peer sexual harassment claims. See Education Department Issues Policy Guid-
ance on Sexual Harassment, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL
5711388. The OCR stated that its policy is consistent "with the Congress' goal in enacting
Title IX-the elimination of sex-based discrimination in federally assisted education
programs," with Supreme Court precedent, and with "well-established legal principles that
have developed under Title IX," Title VI and Title VII. See Sexual Harassment Guid-
ance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,034.
195. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,036 (highlighting the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Rowinsky as "add[ing] to schools' confusion regarding Title IX legal
standards"). For an example of the dissension among federal courts, compare Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.) (rejecting Title VII analysis for Title
IX peer sexual harassment cases), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996), with Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying strict Title VII princi-
ples to peer sexual harassment cases).
196. See Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of
Standards for Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REv. 2049, 2146 (1997) (as-
serting that federal courts will begin to adopt the Title VII "knew or should have known"
standard of institutional liability embraced by the OCR). The impact the new standards
will have on the determination of liability under Title IX is not entirely clear, however,
since the OCR's interpretation is not binding on the courts. See id. at 2147-48.
197. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Davis II) (holding that Title IX does not encompass peer sexual harassment claims); Doe
v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997) (modifying Title VII criteria
to require actual notice in peer sexual harassment suits); see also Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (1998) (rejecting constructive notice as sufficient to
establish school district liability for teacher-on-student sexual harassment absent congres-
sional direction). But see Nicole M. ex rel. Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist.,
964 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (embracing the Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard of institutional liability).
198. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 (stating that a school
district can be liable for peer sexual harassment if the school knew or should have known
of the harassment, but failed to remedy the situation).
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rejecting the applicability of Title IX altogether. 9
Although it is well-recognized that courts "must accord [OCR's] inter-
pretation of Title IX appreciable deference," ' OCR's guidelines are not
binding on federal courts of law. °1 However, because the OCR's Sexual
Harassment Guidance represents the Department of Education's official
interpretation, the policy should be accorded "substantial deference."' ' 2
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that agencies are in the best posi-
tion to resolve difficult or changing circumstances due to their "unique
expertise" in the particular subject matter for which they are authorized
to make policymaking determinations.' °3  Nonetheless, because an
agency's own policy interpretation is not binding, the OCR is forced to
investigate sexual discrimination complaints according to the applicable
law in each jurisdiction. Thus, when courts shun the policies adopted
by the OCR and establish varying approaches to analyze peer sexual
harassment claims, the OCR is forced to compromise its position, while
simultaneously attempting to convince schools to apply its more protec-
tive policies.'O As such, the unsettled debate regarding this tenuous issue
not only deprives students of the uniform protection of the law, but also
hinders OCR investigations and creates uncertainty among school dis-
199. See supra note 197 (listing courts that have rejected the OCR's position regarding
school district liability in the context of peer sexual harassment).
200. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing the degree of
deference courts should accord an agency's interpretation of Title IX), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997); see also Sexual Harassment
Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,036 (noting that courts "discuss according 'appreciable def-
erence' to OCR's interpretation of Title IX").
201. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (acknowledging that courts must at least accord agency interpretations
deference "whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved recon-
ciling conflicting policies").
202. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1469 (1997) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). In Cohen, the court held that a policy interpretation issued
by the OCR should receive substantial deference, since it was an important guide in de-
termining the requirements under Title IX. See id.
203. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151
(1991) (asserting that agencies have the presumptive power to interpret their own regula-
tions).
204. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,048 nn.23 & 27 (acknowl-
edging that the OCR will follow the applicable law in each jurisdiction when investigating
sexual harassment complaints, even though it may be contrary to the OCR's position).
205. See id Notwithstanding case law to the contrary, the OCR urges schools within
jurisdictions affording students less protection under Title IX to follow its policies. See id.
at 12,048 n.27. Indeed, the OCR stated that "to ensure students a safe and nondiscrimina-
tory educational environment, the better practice is for these schools to follow the Guid-
ance." Id.
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tricts concerning their responsibilities regarding compliance with TitleIX.10
In addition to these judicial pronouncements concerning the necessary
deference courts should accord the OCR policy interpretation, the Su-
preme Court has declared that Title IX's scope should be read broadly.'
7
One court, however, in justifying a determination adverse to this man-
date, contended that modifying Title VII would best address the com-
peting concerns surrounding this area of law.0 s These allegedly disposi-
tive concerns ostensibly include the lack of a traditional agency
relationship between a student and a school district, the "intentional
discrimination" requirement espoused in Franklin due to the Spending
Clause origin of Title IX,21° and the need to prevent unlimited exposure
of schools to monetary liability for the "uncondoned acts of students." '
These courts, however, in addition to according OCR policies little def-
erence when inconsistent with established case law, fail to recognize that
the criteria needed to establish a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim, as well as the inherent nature of such a claim, adequately address
206. See id. at 12,048 nn.23 & 27 (discussing how the OCR must alter its investigation
according to the law in each jurisdiction); see also Williams & Brake, supra note 46, at 424
(stating that "[t]he difficulty schools are having addressing student-to-student harassment
reflects the disarray in the courts in this emerging area of the law"). Schools have diffi-
culty responding appropriately when confronted with a sexual harassment situation. See
Ellison, supra note 196, at 2149.
Some commentators have noted additionally that as the law emerges in the context of
peer sexual harassment, schools will become safer environments for all students-a goal
mandated by Title IX. See Williams & Brake, supra note 46, at 456.
207. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
208. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 75 (D.N.H. 1997) (balancing
Congress' purpose in enacting Title IX with the need to limit exposure of the public
budget to liability); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 173-74
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that the Title VII constructive notice standard is inapplicable
to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases because of the lack of an agency relationship be-
tween schools and harassing students); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F.
Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that modifying Title VII criteria is justified be-
cause of the need to show "intentional discrimination").
209. See Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 174-75 (discussing the applicability of agency princi-
ples to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases); supra note 173-74 and accompanying text
(illustrating that liability could not be imposed on a school district for the sexual harass-
ment of one student by another if liability relied solely on agency principles because a stu-
dent is not an agent of a school district).
210. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205 (modifying Title VII criteria to account for the
need to show "intentional discrimination," as ordered in Franklin); supra text accompa-
nying note 74 (explaining Franklin's holding that a school district can be found monetarily
liable only in the case of an intentional violation of Title IX).
211. Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 75.
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212
each of these three concerns.
First, as the OCR and some federal courts acknowledge, an institu-
tion's liability in a hostile environment sexual harassment case depends
on its own actions once it has notice and, thus, does not entail vicarious
liability."3 Rather, the basis for the school district's liability is a form of
"direct" liability, rendering the absence of an agency relationship irrele-
vant . This view is consistent with Title VII case law, which provides
that an employer may be liable for failing to correct a hostile environ-
ment created by third parties who are neither employees nor agents of
the employer .2 " The imposition of liability for hostile environment sex-
212. See generally Doe v Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1423-24 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (explaining how proving the elements of a hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim establishes intent); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040 (ex-
plaining that the nature of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim holds entities
liable for their own actions, not those of an agent). See also supra note 193 (explaining
three ways that adhering to Title VII hostile environment principles can shield a school
district from liability).
213. See Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 477 (D.N.H. 1997)
(explaining that institutional liability for hostile environment sexual harassment "is not a
form of vicarious liability at all, but rather is a form of 'direct' liability because the [institu-
tion] is liable for its own misconduct"); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421 (noting that liability
attaches based on the school's actions or inaction); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 12,039 (discussing the liability of a school for peer sexual harassment). The OCR's
policy guidance asserted that it is "a school's failure to respond to the existence of a hostile
environment within its own programs or activities [that] permits an atmosphere of sexual
discrimination to permeate the educational program and results in discrimination prohib-
ited by Title IX." Id. at 12,039. A school district, however, can avoid violating Title IX
altogether simply by taking immediate and appropriate corrective action. See id. If the
school does not take the required action, subsequent liability would be based on the
school's actions or inaction, not those of the harassing students. See id. The OCR Guid-
ance also established a notice requirement that triggers a school's duty to respond, re-
quiring plaintiffs to show that the school either knew or should have known of the har-
assment. See id. at 12,042. Moreover, the policy guidance noted that a school has notice
"as long as an agent or responsible employee of the school received notice." hd. In the
event that a school, an agent, or a responsible employee of the school is not notified, a
school may still have constructive notice if the harassment is so pervasive that the school
should have known of the hostile environment. See id.
214. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he
absence of an agency relationship is simply irrelevant, given our holding that the liability
[the plaintiff] seeks is direct, rather than agency-based"); Oyster River, 992 F. Supp. at 477
(discussing the method for imposing liability in a hostile environment sexual harassment
cases).
215. See, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D. Nev.
1992) (discussing employer liability for sexual harassment caused by non-employees);
Magnuson v. Peak Technical Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 512-13 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same);
Sparks v. Regional Med. Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 738 n.1 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (same). The
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Bosley v. R-1 Kearney
School District, 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995) noted that finding a basis to impute
conduct of a third party to an employer in Title VII cases depends on whether the em-
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ual harassment is, therefore, direct because it is based on the entity's own
misconduct in failing to respond adequately to the harassment, and not
on the misconduct of the actual harassers. 6
Second, although case law indicates that monetary awards are avail-
able under Title IX only if the school discriminates intentionally based
on sex, thereby satisfying the notice problem,1 7 opponents' contention
that the "knew or should have known" standard of liability is insufficient
to establish this intent is irrational."' As Petaluma noted, courts have
characterized hostile environment cases under Title VII as disparate
treatment claims, which require that a plaintiff show intentional dis-
crimination on the part of the employer."9 Logic dictates that a hostile
work environment claim, therefore, must contain an intentional discrimi-
nation facet as well;22 yet, the "knew or should have known" standard is
still used to satisfy employer liability with respect to acts of low-level
employees and third parties, despite this intent requirement."' Indeed,
the prima facie case need not demand that a plaintiff engage in a sepa-
rate inquiry to establish intentional discrimination because satisfying the
elements of a Title VII hostile environment claim implicitly demon-
strates the existence of intent.22 Accordingly, if the "knew or should
ployer took appropriate remedial action once it obtained sufficient knowledge of the har-
assment. See Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023. The court concluded that Title VII standards
are helpful in the protection of persons from sex discrimination in educational settings as
well. See id.
216. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040.
217. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the notice problem con-
cerning monetary rewards in connection with Spending Clause legislation).
218. See Senatus, supra note 46, at 394 (suggesting that Meritor's "knew or should
have known" standard of liability may be insufficient to establish the required intent to
discriminate); see also Karpenko, supra note 53, at 1305 (claiming that the "knew or
should have known" liability standard could penalize schools that have made efforts to
remedy harassment and that schools should be afforded a chance to resolve the situation
before being forced to pay a monetary reward). But cf Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist.,
949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that intent can be inferred from a school's
failure to remedy a sexually hostile environment of which it has knowledge); Bosley, 904
F. Supp. at, 1021 (stating that intent may be inferred from the totality of the circum-
stances).
219. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1423 (explaining that courts have analyzed hostile
work environment claims based on disparate treatment principles).
220. See id. at 1423-25 (explaining that the disparate treatment nature of a hostile
work environment claim requires the showing of discriminatory intent).
221. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting EEOC v. Haci-
enda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989)).
222. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining
that a plaintiff need not prove intent as part of the prima facie case because the disparate
treatment claim of hostile environment sexual harassment does "not present a factual
question of intentional discrimination which is at all elusive"); see also Andrews v. City of
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have known" standard of liability is sufficient to fulfill the intentional
discrimination requirement in Title VII hostile environment claims, it
should also follow that this same standard is satisfactory in Title IX hos-
tile environment claims.2
Moreover, the court in Petaluma and the OCR note correctly that the
true indicator of intent is not whether a student or other conveyor of in-
formation notifies a school district of a sexually hostile environment;
rather, intent is a product of a school district's response, or lack of re-
sponse, to the harassment.224 Proving that sexually harassing behavior in
the school's programs or activities was so pervasive that the school dis-
trict should have been aware of its existence and failed to take corrective
action implicitly fulfills the intent requirement. As a result, courts that
insist on modifying Title VII liability standards by requiring a separate
intent element have created an unnecessary and overly burdensome
threshold for students.226 Students who have been victims of such blatant
and overt hostile environment sexual harassment that any reasonably
prudent school would have noticed, but who have been too fearful of
possible retaliation to complain, are especially at risk if schools are not
forced to take action before actual notice arises.27
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that in hostile environment
cases "the intent to discriminate on basis of sex ... is implicit, and thus should be recog-
nized as a matter of course"); Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1424 (noting that the elements of a
hostile environment claim establish the intent, and thus, further proof is unnecessary).
223. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (finding that the Title VII standard for inten-
tional discrimination is appropriate in the Title IX hostile environment peer sexual har-
assment context); Kaija Clark, Note, School Liability and Compensation for Title IX Sex-
ual Harassment Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 376 (1998)
(reasoning that the similarity between sexual harassment in the workplace and sexual har-
assment in the educational setting dictates that Title VII standards should be applied to
Title IX).
224. Cf. Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1421 (discussing the Rowinsky court's misinterpre-
tation of the nature of Title IX liability); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at
12,048 n.27 (same); see also supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (discussing the rela-
tionship between the element of intent and the "knew or should have known" standard of
institutional liability).
225. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1423 (describing the two elements of intent inherent
in a hostile environment sexual harassment claim); supra notes 187-88 and accompanying
text (explaining why it would be redundant to require a separate showing of an element of
intent).
226. Cf Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1423 (illustrating that no additional proof of intent
is necessary once a plaintiff establishes the elements required to prove a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim).
227. See Julie Shaflucas, Legislative Reform, Sexual Harassment Between Students:
Whether to Turn a Blind or Watchful Eye, 23 J. LEGIS. 317, 319 (1997) (noting that an ac-
tual notice standard protects against blatant sexual harassment in the school environment
only when a student asks the school to remedy the situation).
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Third, in response to those who opine that a constructive notice stan-
dard would potentially expose a school district's budget to limitless li-
ability, the elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim
dictate otherwise.2u Indeed, monetary liability should become an issue
only if a hostile environment actually exists, the school has a valid reason
to know of its existence, and the school chooses to ignore the situation. 22
Accordingly, as the OCR's Sexual Harassment Guidance explains, if
sexually harassing behavior in a school's programs or activities is not
"severe, persistent, or pervasive" enough to establish a hostile environ-
ment, the school district will not be liable.m Likewise, no liability will re-
sult if a hostile environment does exist and the school takes immediate
and appropriate corrective action.23 Nonetheless, simple morals should
228. See supra note 193 (discussing how the elements of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim work to shield the school district from liability). To assuage those fear-
ing a major depletion of public educational funds in the event that the Title VII liability
standard is implemented in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases, Congress should enact
legislation capping monetary relief at $300,000. See Clark, supra note 223, at 378 (calling
for Congress to cap monetary relief under Title IX, as it did under Title VII).
229. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 (stating the elements
that must exist for a school to be liable for peer sexual harassment under Title IX); Kernie,
supra note 2, at 173 (discussing the financial effect that a monetary remedy could have on
educational institutions); supra note 193 (discussing the ways a school district may shield
itself from liability).
230. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (stating that the Title VII hostile environment
standard is not a strict liability standard and, thus, an entity will not be liable for "sporadic
or minor incidents"); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039; see also supra
note 154 (discussing factors that may result in a severe, persistent, or pervasive environ-
ment for purposes of creating a sexually hostile environment).
231. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (noting that the Title VII standard allows
schools sufficient discretion in attempting to remedy sexual harassment before liability
becomes an issue); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039-40, 12,042 (ex-
plaining that once a school has notice of the existence of a hostile environment, the re-
sponse must be "reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile envi-
ronment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again").
Determining what type of response is reasonable will depend on the circumstances of a
given case. See id. at 12,042. The OCR suggested that when a school receives information
of a possible incident of sexual harassment, it should discuss what actions the parents or
student are seeking to rectify the problem. See id. The school should then conduct a
prompt investigation to determine if the allegations are true. See id. The school should
thereafter take appropriate steps to resolve the situation. See id. Factors to consider
when deciding what steps to take include: the nature of the complaint, the source of the
allegation, the student's or students' age, and the school's size and administrative struc-
ture. See id. Moreover, a school may have to implement interim measures during the in-
vestigation of a complaint, especially if the incident involves a sexual assault or criminal
activity. See id. at 12,043. Measures that ultimately may be employed to resolve a situa-
tion can include counseling, warnings, and disciplinary action against the harasser. See id
If these steps do not achieve the desired result, further measures such as separating the
harasser and the victim may be necessary. See id.
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dissuade courts from compromising the emotional stability of schoolchil-
dren on the basis of economic concerns. 2
In addition to the foregoing arguments, it is simply egregious public
policy to allow schools the ability to escape responsibility by willfully ig-
noring blatant episodes of sexual harassment within its programs or ac-
tivities just because no one issued a direct complaint in compliance with
an actual notice standard of institutional liability. 33 Once the trier of fact
confirms that a sexually hostile environment existed, and that the abuse
was so severe that the school should have become aware of the harass-
ment, the courts should assume that a school district in fact had sufficient
notice to impose liability.3 Otherwise, schools will be able to circum-
vent Congress's entire purpose for enacting Title IX-to provide an edu-
cational environment free from invidious sex discrimination.
Finally, given the recent public exposure,236 the ample statistics con-
cerning the prevalence of sexual harassment in schools, 237 and the clear
policy guidance issued by the OCR,23 courts should no longer be able to
protect schools under the pretense that they lack notice of potential li-
ability in cases of peer sexual harassment because Congress did not men-
232. See Kernie, supra note 2, at 173 (stating that "[vjictims of sex discrimination
should not be denied the right to be compensated for their losses merely because a dam-
ages award exacts a stiff economic toll on an institution that has engaged in intentional
discrimination").
233. See Nicole M. ex rel. Jacqueline M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp.
1369, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (declaring that "a principal, vice-principal or teacher cannot
put her head in the sand once she has been alerted to a severe and pervasive hostile educa-
tional environment"); Shaflucas, supra note 227, at 319 (stating that "[a]n actual notice
standard allows schools to ignore blatant and persistent sexual harassment between stu-
dents until.they are asked to remedy the situation"). It has been further asserted that a
constructive notice standard can effectively induce schools to create and maintain a
learning program free from chronic sexual harassment. See id. at 319. Indeed, this may be
the only way to desocialize students from viewing women in a subversive manner and to
change attitudes toward women as a whole. See id.
234. See Senatus, supra note 46, at 395 (stating that "[t]he assumption that the school
'should have known' about student harassment puts school districts on notice of possible
liability").
235. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803, 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that
Title IX "is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later
careers"); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (explaining how the application of Title VII stan-
dards to Title IX disputes will further the congressional purpose of eliminating sex dis-
crimination underlying the statute).
236. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (illustrating examples of recent public
recognition of peer sexual harassment).
237. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (citing statistics from a study conducted
by the American Association of University Women Education Foundation).
238. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997).
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tion expressly that such harassment constitutes a violation of Title IX
prior to acceptance of federal funds. 29 Not only did Title IX notify edu-
cational institutions receiving government aid that they would have an
affirmative duty to maintain an environment free from sex discrimina-
tion,2 the Supreme Court also noted that changes in circumstances are
better dealt with by the uniquely capable agencies responsible for im-
plementing congressional acts.2" For the most part, federal courts have
since proven resoundingly the wisdom of that sentiment via their incon-
sistent rulings under Title IX peer sexual harassment cases, and thus,
should finally accord the OCR the deference to which it is entitled.2 42




Although courts are not bound by OCR guidelines in their adjudica-
tion of claims against school districts for peer sexual harassment, they
should nonetheless begin to adopt policies consistent with the OCR's
stance. Not only do youthful victims of sexually abusive behavior de-
serve the utmost protection of the laws, but school districts should no
longer have the discretion of choosing between the more lenient provi-
sions established by the courts or the stricter measures advocated by the
OCR. Such confusion interferes with the OCR's ability to enforce its
policies, weakens Congress's initiative to provide a school environment
free from discrimination, and ultimately, denies children the most com-
239. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(suggesting that schools have sufficient notice that peer sexual harassment most likely ex-
ists in their schools due to the presence of ample statistics; thus, failure to remedy inci-
dents of severe harassment may result in the inference that the school intended the conse-
quences of that failure to act). Perhaps those courts which "adhere to an actual notice
standard are, in effect, stating that a pervasive culture of sexual harassment between stu-
dents is okay and normal as long as no one is 'actually' complaining." Shaflucas, supra
note 227, at 325.
240. Cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (stating
that Title IX "unquestionably" created a "duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex" and
that sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex discrimination).
241. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151
(1991) (discussing the ability of agencies to develop policy in areas where they possess a
particularized expertise).
242. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1427 (reasoning that OCR interpretations are in-
dicative of public policy and, accordingly, should be persuasive in the court's analysis); su-
pra notes 200-203 and accompanying text (illustrating the deference that agency interpre-
tations are supposed to receive).
243. See supra note 197 (discussing cases decided after, and in opposition to, OCR's
Sexual Harassment Guidance).
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prehensive means of protection.
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